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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The United States Air Force (USAF) and Department of Defense (DoD) space 
systems acquisition process has increasingly become synonymous with exorbitant cost 
overruns, substantial schedule delays, and sometimes outright program failure.  At a 
recent National Defense Industrial Association conference, Senator Wayne Allard 
(Republican from Colorado and member of the Senate Appropriations Committee) 
quoted the Defense Science Board (DSB) and the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) as having significant concerns over issues pertaining to the cost and performance 
of our national security space systems (Allard, 2005).  Additionally, the DSB and GAO 
have discovered that it is the acquisition process that is the cause of these problems.  Cost 
and performance issues are not new, and many have been addressed repeatedly in the past 
by numerous Congressional panels and commissions. 
Because the environmental and orbital considerations in dealing with operations 
outside of the Earth environment are unnaturally foreign as compared to most human 
endeavors, the acquisition of space systems is inherently a more complex and time 
consuming process than that of traditional Earth-bound systems.  Consequently, there are 
bound to be difficulties in estimating the required cost and schedule to meet a certain 
performance/capability.  The acquisition of satellite systems is difficult enough – so the 
process by which these systems are developed must not be allowed to become the most 
significant burden.  Senator Allard has stated, “our nation’s dominance in space is being 
challenged not so much from outside this country but from within.  In many respects, we 
have become our own worst enemy.”  He went on to say “we have done everything 
possible to sabotage our space supremacy” (Allard, 2005).  Not only do the acquisition 
and engineering professionals thus need to deal with the inherently difficult task of 
developing space systems, but they must also utilize a very complex system to do so.  
Unfortunately, as many of the Congressional panels and commissions of the last two 
decades have shown, many of the USAF personnel responsible for systems engineering 
in support of systems acquisition do not know what their defined role is or how to 
complete their job well. 
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One area that needs more attention in the realm of space systems acquisition is 
systems engineering management expertise.  Good systems engineering is a critical 
component of systems acquisition.  Do the USAF systems engineers involved in space 
systems acquisition know what their role is?  Do they have the right skill set to 
effectively and efficiently perform their systems engineering management 
responsibilities?  As documented in the 2001 Space Commission Report and the 2003 
Defense Science Board’s Young Panel, the Department of Defense acquisition system 
has seen the rise and fall of Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) as a 
preferred acquisition approach.  Additionally, there has been a noted decrease in systems 
engineering expertise throughout the 1990’s.  Recently, the United States Air Force 
Space Command (AFSPC) has recognized there are career progression issues in space 
systems acquisition and is currently in the midst of a renewed emphasis on Space 
Professional Development.  This emphasis includes the cadre of space acquisition 
professionals.  Finally, since the very beginning of space systems acquisition, the 
Department of Defense has relied on the expertise of Federally Funded Research and 
Development Centers (FFRDC) to support the space systems engineering and acquisition 
processes.  Each of these areas – the use of TSPR, draw-down of systems engineering 
expertise, career progression, and utilization of FFRDC – has, in its own way, lead to the 
current posture of United States Air Force space systems engineering and space systems 
acquisition.  Some of these areas have helped, and some of these areas have hindered, the 
ability of the USAF to properly acquire national security space systems.  The issues 
associated with these areas should be more thoroughly understood in order to better 
prepare the United States Air Force to design and build the space satellite systems of 
tomorrow. 
B. PURPOSE 
This research is intended to provide an understanding of the underlying issues 
associated with the areas discussed above in order to assist the USAF more effectively 
and efficiently develop and procure space systems for the Department of Defense.  This 
research will help define the proper role of the government systems engineer within the 
acquisition process and identify what skills are required of a government systems 
engineer to successfully conduct systems engineering activities in support of systems 
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acquisition.  The intent of this research is to identify any systemic issues associated with 
USAF space systems engineering management expertise and how these issues relate to 
high cost and schedule overruns.  The objective of this research is to qualitatively analyze 
the differences between the traditional USAF systems acquisition and the national 
security space systems acquisition, as well as previous efforts to improve these 
acquisition processes, in an effort to provide specific recommendations that can be 
implemented in an effort to improve USAF systems engineering management skills and 
thereby improve the USAF national security space systems acquisition process.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research attempts to answer this primary question:  Are there systemic 
systems acquisition issues as a result of past DoD and USAF policies and practices that 
have impacted the ability of the United States Air Force to properly perform systems 
engineering in support of the acquisition process?  Answering this question requires an 
answer to each of the following specific research questions: 
1.  Are there common systems engineering policy or process issues that have 
impacted the skill-set and experience of Air Force personnel to properly support the 
acquisition of satellite systems? 
2.  What is the lasting legacy of the Total System Performance Responsibility 
(TSPR) on the ability of Air Force space systems engineering personnel to support the 
space systems acquisition process? 
3.  How significant are the remaining impacts of the 1990’s drawdown of systems 
engineering expertise on the ability of Air Force space systems engineering personnel to 
support the space systems acquisition process? 
4.  Are there any impacts of career progression and personnel continuity issues on 
the ability of Air Force space systems engineering personnel to support the space systems 
acquisition process? 
5.  How does the heavy reliance on Federally Funded Research and Development 
Centers (FFRDC) help or hinder the ability of the United States Air Force to properly 
design and develop space systems? 
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It is the hope of this author that the answers to these questions, obtained through 
researching and analyzing the history of DoD and USAF space systems acquisition and 
space systems engineering, will lead to and form the basis of recommendations put forth 
in Chapter V for future improvements in the current posture of USAF space systems 
engineering.  
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study will attempt to provide specific recommendations to the United States 
Air Force and Department of Defense for increasing the ability of space systems 
engineering personnel to perform their proper systems engineering role in support of the 
national security space systems acquisition process. 
E. SCOPE  
The emphasis of this thesis directly pertains to past and current systemic issues 
that have impacted the ability of Air Force personnel to understand and properly perform 
their role of systems engineering in support of space systems acquisition.  The work will 
qualitatively analyze previous and existing policy recommendations in order to determine 
the lasting legacy on space systems engineering of the Total System Performance 
Responsibility acquisition methodology, the drawdown of systems engineering expertise 
in the 1990’s, the impact of career progression and personnel continuity concerns, as well 
as the advantages and disadvantages associated with a heavy reliance on Federally 
Funded Research and Development Centers.  Finally, this thesis will attempt to make 
specific recommendations to help solve problems resulting from these policies. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
1.  Conduct a literature review of the objectives and skills required for successful 
systems engineering.  Also, conduct review of the relationship between systems 
engineering as a component of systems acquisition and program management. 
2.  Review the current Department of Defense policies and guidance for systems 
engineering and systems acquisition. 
3.  Review the current National Security Space policies and guidance for systems 
engineering and systems acquisition. 
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4.  Conduct a literature review of the peculiarities of space systems and compare 
them to traditional military systems. 
5.  Conduct an in-depth review of the history of space systems acquisition.  In 
particular, conduct a detailed review of previous Congressional panels, commissions, and 
reform initiatives to qualitatively investigate the impact these initiatives have had on the 
ability of United States Air Force personnel to properly use systems engineering in 
support of systems acquisition. 
6.  Conduct a brief review of some past United States Air Force space programs, 
both successful and not-successful to look for trends in acquisition and systems 
engineering policies. 
7.  Correlate information and findings resulting from this research to determine 
specific research findings.  Discuss the research findings with a recognized expert in the 
space systems engineering field in order to corroborate the information and findings.  
8.  Using the gathered information and research findings, formulate specific 
recommendations that can help United States Air Force personnel properly know their 
role and conduct systems engineering in support of Department of Defense space systems 
acquisition. 
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II contains a review of 
general systems engineering practices and what skills are required to successfully 
conduct systems engineering.  It also provides a description of some of the specific skills 
required for conducting systems engineering for aircraft and space systems acquisition.  
This chapter also contains the results of some literature research and delves into the 
specific Department of Defense and United States Air Force systems engineering and 
acquisition processes.  Finally, it also includes a comparison and contrast of space 
systems engineering activities for aircraft vs. satellite systems acquisition.  The bulk of 
Chapter III contains a review of DoD and USAF space systems acquisition policy in an 
attempt to gather some preliminary lessons learned and trend information pertaining to 
systems engineering expertise in the United States Air Force.  The rest of chapter III 
includes a review of a few past and current space acquisition programs.  Chapter IV, ties 
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the literature review from Chapters II and III to the research questions formulated above 
to provide the resulting research findings.  Chapter IV also provides other significant 
trends discovered as part of this research and concludes with information gathered 
through a personal interview in support of these research findings.  Chapter V presents an 
overview of the current status of United States Air Force space systems acquisition and 
provides recommendations based on the research findings in Chapter IV.  Finally, 



























II. REVIEW OF SYSTEMS ACQUISITION AND SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before delving into the issues of Department of Defense and United States Air 
Force space systems engineering, the terms ‘system’ and ‘systems engineering’ must first 
be defined.  Their definitions can be particularly important to an organization because its 
organizational culture is defined in part by how it defines its roles and responsibilities 
(Ancona, Kochan, Scully, Van Maanen, & Westney, 2005).  Suffice it to say, there is no 
common definition of a ‘system’ or ‘systems engineering.’  The INCOSE (International 
Council on Systems Engineering) website posts Rechtin’s definition of a ‘system.’   
A system is a construct or collection of different elements that together 
produce results not obtainable by the elements alone.  The elements, or 
parts, can include people, hardware, software, facilities, policies, and 
documents; that is, all things required to produce systems-level results.  
The results include system level qualities, properties, characteristics, 
functions, behavior and performance.  The value added by the system as a 
whole, beyond that contributed independently by the parts, is primarily 
created by the relationship among the parts; that is, how they are 
interconnected.  (Rechtin, 2000) 
A system is thus more than the sum of its parts.  Furthermore, although INCOSE 
recognizes no single definition of the term ‘systems engineering,’ the INCOSE website 
summarizes the term ‘systems engineering’ as follows:  
Systems Engineering is an engineering discipline whose responsibility is 
creating and executing an interdisciplinary process to ensure that the 
customer and stakeholder’s needs are satisfied in a high quality, 
trustworthy, cost efficient and schedule compliant manner throughout a 
system’s entire life cycle.  (www.incose.org, 2006) 
The INCOSE concept of systems engineering emphasizes an ‘interdisciplinary approach’ 
that combines the ‘customer and stakeholder’s needs.’  Finally, it states that systems 
engineering must be completed in a manner that accounts for quality, in addition to cost 
and schedule performance over the entire life-cycle of the system.  These key tenants 
provide for a holistic approach that incorporates quality, cost, and schedule in addition to 
meeting the basic needs of the customer. 
8 
The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) at Los Angeles Air Force Base 
(LAAFB), the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) at Fort-Belvoir, Virginia, and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have also defined ‘system’ and 
‘systems engineering’ as they relate to space systems engineering.  According to the 
DAU’s Systems Engineering Fundamentals text, a system “is an integrated composite of 
people, products, and processes that provide a capability to satisfy a stated need or 
objective (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2001), while according to the “SMC 
Systems Engineering Primer & Handbook,” a system “can be thought of as a set of 
elements that interact with one another in an organized or interrelated fashion toward a 
common purpose that cannot be achieved by any of the elements alone or by all of the 
elements without the underlying organization” (Space and Missile Systems Center 
[SMC], 2005).  Though these definitions are different, they both define an integrated 
product to fulfill some purpose or need.  More specifically to the purposes of this 
research, a military system is defined by SMC as a system “to provide a needed or 
desired operational capability to the military forces or to support the military forces in 
achieving or maintaining an operational capability” (SMC, 2005).  Military systems can 
be weapons or support systems.  According to the National Security Space Acquisition 
Policy 03-01 (NSSAP 03-01), “National Security Space is defined as the combined space 
activities of the DoD and National Intelligence Community (IC)” (Department of 
Defense [DoD], 2004).  By combining the definitions reviewed thus far, a military space 
system can be defined as a particular type of military system.  Military space systems are 
systems based in, through, or from space that are weapons or support systems to provide 
a needed operational capability to the military or to support the military.  For purposes of 
this research, the focus will be on the space segment of a military space system, and the 
term ‘satellite’ will be used as applicable. 
Using these definitions, ‘systems engineering’ can simply be defined as applying 
an engineering discipline to a system.  According to the SMC Primer, this is a valid 
statement.  “Engineering is the application of science to develop, design, and produce 
logical and/or physical objects such as buildings, machines, or a computer program to 
fulfill a desired need or to achieve an objective.  To state the obvious then, systems 
engineering is the engineering of a system – it is the application of science to design a 
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system.  …the ultimate objective is a design for the system.  All else is important and 
useful only to the extent that it contributes to the efficient achievement of that objective” 
(SMC, 2005).  However, according to the DAU’s Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 
systems engineering is not so simple, rather it is a combination of two “significant 
disciplines” – “the technical knowledge domain in which the systems engineer operates, 
and systems engineering management” (DAU, 2001).  Therefore, “systems engineering is 
an interdisciplinary engineering management process that evolves and verifies an 
integrated, life-cycle balanced set of system solutions that satisfy customer needs” (DAU, 
2001).  The NASA Handbook defines systems engineering in much broader terms than 
does the SMC Primer.  According to NASA, system engineering is “a robust approach to 
the design, creation, and operation of systems.  In simple terms, the approach consists of 
the identification and qualification of system goals, creation of alternative system design 
concepts, performance of design trades, selection and implementation of the best design, 
verification that the design is properly built and integrated, and post-implementation 
assessment of how well the system meets (or not) the goals” (National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration [NASA], 1995).   
As noted by Ancona, et al., an organization’s culture can be impacted by the 
accepted definition of common terms.  Therefore, if a systems engineering process is to 
be understood and utilized effectively, it must be based on a common mindset by those 
who use the process and/or its outputs.  It is vitally important for the role of the systems 
engineer to be properly defined within the context of the overall systems acquisition 
process if it is to be effectively integrated in an acquisition program.  Additionally, if the 
systems engineer is expected to be of assistance in controlling the overall acquisition 
program’s cost, schedule, risk and performance/capability baselines, he or she must be 
provided with or already have the required skills and tools to perform the defined roles.  
Otherwise, a critical mismatch of high expectations to limited results will occur.   
B. SUCCESSFUL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
1.   Objectives of Successful Systems Engineering 
In Visualizing Program Management, the authors state “the system 
engineer/manager – second only to the project manager in responsibility and 
accountability – is responsible for the technical integrity of the project while meeting the 
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cost and performance objectives of the project requirements” (Forsberg, Mooz, & 
Cotterman, 2000).  In defining the objective of systems engineering, NASA also 
emphasizes a large burden of technical responsibility in addition to balancing other 
programmatic factors: “The objective of systems engineering is to see to it that the 
system is designed, built, and operated so that it accomplishes its purpose in the most 
cost-effective way possible, considering performance, cost, schedule, and risk” (NASA, 
1995).  The SMC Primer focuses more heavily on the technical aspects of systems 
engineering, stating the systems engineer “is first and foremost responsible that the ‘right 
system’ is developed to meet the customer’s needs” and “shall ensure that the ultimate 
system is ‘developed right’” (SMC, 2005).  Again, there are differing definitions of the 
roles and responsibilities of systems engineers between NASA and SMC.  The difference 
is particularly important to note because each of these organizations must take care to 
ensure its personnel are equipped with the necessary skills and tools required to perform 
their defined roles and responsibilities. 
2. Skills Required for Successful Systems Engineering 
Many skills are required to be successful at systems engineering.  Although there 
is no single, magical list of required skills, for purposes of this research, the skills can 
roughly be summarized in the following, not-all-inclusive list (incorporated from 
Visualizing Program Management, the SMC Primer, and DAU’s Systems Engineering 
Fundamentals). 
• Requirements generation/management 
• Problem-solving 
• Phasing/planning/baseline management 
• Integration and test 
• Analysis/modeling and simulation 
• Risk management 
• Interface control 
• Understand required technology 
• Concept/architecture design 
In 2000, Sarah Sheard described the twelve roles of a systems engineer.  At the 
time, INCOSE had not accepted a single definition of a ‘systems engineer’ or ‘systems 
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engineering,’ and Sheard’s articles were an attempt to provide a “vocabulary to what 
people meant when they were talking about systems engineering” (Sheard, 2000).  The 
twelve roles overlap with the skills shown above and include:  “requirements owner, 
system designer, system analyst, validation/verification engineer, logistics/operations 
engineer, glue among subsystems, customer interface, technical manager, information 
manager, process engineer, coordinator, and classified ads systems engineer” (Sheard, 
2000).   
Some of the skills on the list of skills are very specialized tools (e.g., modeling 
and simulation) that demand the systems engineer first have a solid grounding in the 
knowledge of his/her discipline (SMC, 2005).  Others are more closely related to the 
“artistic” side of systems engineering (e.g., concept/architecture design).  Systems 
engineering is not simply science applied to design.  It is “important to note that in most 
cases the engineer has no direct way to arrive at the design such as by a set of 
formulas…instead he or she must create (or invent),” and in most cases, the engineer will 
be held responsible to balance “such factors as cost, producibility, and the design margin 
that accounts for uncertainties” (SMC, 2005).   
The DAU Systems Engineering Fundamentals guide requires a systems engineer 
to have the proper skills to enforce what it calls a “recursive problem-solving process” 
applied throughout the entire acquisition process.  These skills correspond to the scope 
and responsibility put forth by the definition and objectives of systems engineering.  
However, there is an area of potential vagueness in the SMC Primer.  The Primer 
suggests a systems engineer should have the skills to properly balance several factors – 
including cost – yet, as noted previously, the systems engineer’s responsibility is not 
defined to include these factors.  The balance between the defined roles and 
responsibilities of a systems engineer and the skill-set of the systems engineer can 
dramatically impact his/her ability to successfully support the acquisition program.  This 
may also impact the expectations and relationship between a systems engineer and a 
program manager. 
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3. Relationship of Systems Engineering and Program 
Management/Acquisitions 
According to the Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, the two fundamental 
requirements for a program manager are to use an Integrated Product and Process 
approach (specifically including systems engineering) whenever possible and to utilize 
and enforce a rigorous systems engineering approach (Department of Defense [DoD], 
2003b).  This process “is a top-down comprehensive, iterative and recursive problem-
solving process, applied sequentially through all stages of development” (DAU, 2001).   
There is a balance of responsibility between the systems engineer and the program 
manager.  The program manager is responsible for the success or failure of a program by 
fulfilling the requirements of the customer, stimulating a positive work environment and 
generating a positive return on investment (Forsberg, et al).  However, the program 
manager cannot alone complete the activities listed here and absolutely must rely on solid 
information and input from the systems engineer.  “A major part of the system engineer’s 
role is to provide information that the [program] manager can use to make the right 
decisions” (NASA, 1995).  More specifically, the systems engineer’s responsibility is “to 
provide the tools, analyses, and technology trades required to help decision-making by 
balancing the desired user capabilities against the program cost, schedule and risk.”  This 
responsibility of the systems engineer does not change the ultimate responsibility of the 
course of action from the program manager, but rather shows how inextricably linked 
these disciplines are and how dependent the program manager is on good systems 
engineering expertise.  Finally, the overall program performance in terms of cost, 
schedule and risk directly reflects the technical plan and the ability of the systems 
engineer to execute the technical plan (SMC, 2005). 
“There is no ‘typical’ system acquisition” (DAU, 2001).  Although there may not 
be a ‘typical’ system acquisition, and no matter how different space systems acquisition 
is from general acquisition, systems engineering and systems acquisition are inextricably 
linked.  “The application of systems engineering management coincides with acquisition 
phasing” (DAU, 2001).  As described in Systems Engineering Fundamentals, “systems 
engineering is the technical management component of DoD acquisition management” 
(DAU, 2001).  Therefore, systems engineering, when combined with business 
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management and contract management, comprises the general framework for a successful 
acquisition management approach.  Supporting the overall systems acquisition, the 
systems engineering management process contains three integrated activities including 
“developmental phasing that controls the design process and provides baselines that 
coordinate design efforts,” a process of systems engineering “that provides a structure for 
solving design problems and tracking requirements flow through the design effort,” and 
“life-cycle integration that involves customers in the design process.”  These activities 
help ensure the system will meet the requirements and will be supportable throughout the 
life-cycle (DAU, 2001). 
Though the program manager and systems engineer are different individuals, their 
jobs and responsibilities are tightly interwoven.  The SMC Primer ties the overall 
program performance, specifically including cost and schedule performance, to the 
systems engineer’s execution of the technical plan.  Therefore, the engineering and 
acquisition framework used by SMC should carefully define the role and responsibility of 
the systems engineer appropriately and ensure he/she has the required skills and training 
to properly perform these responsibilities. 
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND 
ACQUISITIONS 
At the Defense Department level, there is surprisingly little clear direction in 
terms of systems engineering processes.  The lead acquisition policy document, 
Department of Defense Directive 5000.1 (DoDD 5000.1) and its companion instruction, 
the Department of Defense Instructive 5000.2 (DoDI 5000.2) contain only four 
references to systems engineering.  Three of these four references are tangential 
references to a “systems engineering methodology” or a “systems engineering process” 
within the realms of sustainment, human factors engineering, and environmental, safety, 
and occupational health (DoD, 2003b).  There is very little description of any of these 
realms.  Though the “5000 Series,” as this set of documents is commonly referred, are 
certainly high-level policy documents, the extent of formal direction to acquisition 
programs in using systems engineering is contained in Enclosure 1 of DoDD 5000.1.   
E1.1.27 Systems Engineering.  Acquisition programs shall be managed 
through the application of a systems engineering approach that optimizes 
the total system performance and minimizes the total ownership costs.  A 
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modular, open-systems approach shall be employed, where feasible.  
(DoD, 2003a) 
This reference from Enclosure 1 of DoDD 5000.1 is the only use of the term 
‘systems engineering’ within DoDD 5000.1.  There is no explicit definition of a systems 
engineering process, methodology, or any guidance on how to optimize the opposing 
goals of total system performance and minimized total ownership costs.  Similarly, there 
is no defining information on employing a “modular, open-systems approach.”  Such a 
lack of specific guidance makes it difficult for systems engineers to be able to define their 
roles appropriately.  The Joint Program Management Handbook also acknowledges 
systems engineering as a critical discipline, but it fails to deliver any specific guidance. 
As with service programs, SE [systems engineering] in joint program 
management is an essential tool.  Interrelationships, e.g., sensor to ground 
station, munitions to multiple component platforms, can be analyzed by 
operational research techniques to develop optimal solutions.  When 
combined with analysis of key performance parameters and operational 
testing, systems engineering can help a joint PM [program manager] 
effectively limit risk in a very complex undertaking.  (DAU, 2004) 
The DoDD 5000.1 provides for a Total Systems Approach (documented as the 
“Defense Acquisition Management Framework” in DoDI 5000.2) to developing and 
delivering weapon systems, but this Total Systems Approach is specifically not the 
systems engineer’s job and the systems engineer is not explicitly discussed as part of this 
process.  “The PM shall be the single point of accountability for accomplishing program 
objectives for the total life-cycle systems management, including sustainment” (DoD, 
2003a).  “The Program Manager (PM) is the designated individual… accountable for 
credible cost, schedule, and performance” (DoD, 2003a).  The “Defense Acquisition 
Management Framework” from DoDI 5000.2 is shown below. 
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Figure 1.   Defense Acquisition Management Framework (From DoDI 5000.2) 
Within this framework, the program manager and the MDA (milestone decision 
authority) are given flexibility to “structure a tailored, responsive, and innovative 
program” (DoD, 2003b).  The User Needs and Technology Opportunities represent the 
outputs of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff “Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System [JCIDS].”  The JCIDS process assists the JROC (Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council) “in identifying, assessing and prioritizing joint military 
capability needs” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).  Within this process, a 
brand new idea would be initiated by a Concept Decision entry into the Concept 
Refinement phase.  The purpose of this phase is “to refine the initial concept” and 
develop a Technology Development Strategy for use in the next phase.  With a successful 
Milestone A decision, the Technology Development phase can begin.  The purpose of 
this phase is “to reduce technology risk and to determine the appropriate set of 
technologies to be integrated into a full system” (DoD, 2003b).  Technology 
Development ends when “an affordable increment of militarily-useful capability has been 
identified” and the associated technology has been demonstrated in “a relevant 
environment.”  A successful Milestone B decision follows the Technology Development 
phase and represents the first time the activity becomes a formal acquisition program.  
The next phase is System Development and Demonstration (SDD) and consists of two 
major efforts: System Integration and System Demonstration.  A successful Milestone B 
decision may allow entry at either one of these.  The general purpose of SDD is to 
develop the increment of capability, reduce risks, and conduct sufficient design activity to 
“demonstrate system integration, interoperability, safety, and utility” (DoD, 2003b).  
Following System Development and Demonstration is the Production and Deployment 
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phase.  This phase follows a successful Milestone C decision and can only be entered if 
all of the entrance criteria (including but not limited to “acceptable performance in 
development, test and evaluation and operational assessment).  The primary focus of this 
phase is to provide an operational capability that achieves mission needs and it also 
includes an operational test and evaluation.  Finally, this phase includes the low-rate 
initial production (LRIP), if there is to be one, and the full-rate production decision.  The 
final phase noted in the DoDI 5000.2 framework is the Operations and Support phase.  
There is no formal Milestone to initiate this phase and this phase starts as a natural 
progression of sustainment after fielding.  The final phase culminates in disposal when a 
program has reached the end of its useful life.  The MDA’s approval  to proceed to each 
next phase is granted after the specific entrance criteria for the next phase are met.  
Specific entrance criteria for each phase shown in DoDI 5000.2 ensure the ensuing phase 
is executable, the program is viable, and there is a validated need to continue. 
The purpose of the framework summarized above is “to acquire quality products 
that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to mission capability and 
operational support, in a timely manner, and at a fair and reasonable price.”  It is intended 
to be flexible and responsive and to provide affordable and timely systems to the users 
(DoD, 2003a).  Flexibility exists to allow the MDA to determine the best point to enter 
the process and also to allow an evolutionary approach or a spiral development.  These 
alternative approaches to acquisition allow a program to proceed into later phases of 
development while new spirals re-enter at an earlier phase in the process.  Although this 
DoDD 5000.2 framework is intended to flexibly provide “quality products” within a “fair 
and reasonable price,” in 2004, then-Under Secretary of the Air Force (USecAF) Peter B. 
Teets, as the Space Milestone Decision Authority, granted a blanket waiver from utilizing 
the DoDI 5000.2 for all current and future programs to be executed by or under the 
authority of the AFPEO/SP (Air Force Program Executive Officer for Space).  This 
waiver is documented in the USecAF memorandum “Update to the National Security 
Space Acquisition Policy 03-01,” dated 27 December 2004.  Instead, national security 
space programs should follow the alternative acquisition approach described in the 
National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01. 
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D. SPACE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND ACQUISITIONS 
On 27 December 2004, National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01 
(NSSAP 03-01) was codified as a distinct approach to acquiring Department of Defense 
Space Systems apart from the standard DoDD 5000.1 acquisition approach.  “The NSS 
[National Security Space] model emphasizes the decision needs for “high-tech” small 
quantity NSS programs, versus the DoD 5000 model that is typically focused on making 
the best large quantity production decision” (DoD, 2004).  Additionally, NSSAP 03-01 
focuses on a more efficient process, “[t]his policy describes the streamlined decision 
making framework for all DoD space system” major defense acquisition programs, to 
support the fact that, due to front-loaded funding profiles, the key decisions for space 
programs must typically be made much earlier in the program.  Figure 2 shows a 
comparison of the DoDI 5000.2 process to that of NSSAP 03-01. 
 
Figure 2.   Acquisition Process Comparison (From NSSAP 03-01) 
Although the basic phasing of the NSSAP 03-01 process is very similar to the 
framework of DoDI 5000.2, there are some key differences that make the acquisition 
process more adaptable to space acquisition programs.  A greater emphasis is on 
achieving the Phase B and Phase C decisions (known as “Key Decision Points” or KDP 
in NSSAP 03-01) earlier.  These earlier decisions force greater effort on early risk 
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reduction and more focus on architectural development instead of technology 
development.  Additionally, there is a greater focus on getting requirements firmly 
established sooner.  Not only are the JROC Capabilities Design Document (CDD) and 
Capabilities Production Document (CPD) approved earlier to support the earlier KDP, 
but there is a “System Requirements Review” (SRR) established as part of Phase A.  
Finally, another key distinction is the earlier entry into Phase C, the last phase.  The 
earlier entry into Phase C allows much more time to conduct detailed testing prior to 
launch.  For a space system, there is little chance to “re-do” a test if the launch is done 
pre-maturely.  The additional time in the last phase for greater up-front testing allows for 
more risk reducing activities prior to launch of a satellite. 
In establishing a separate acquisition process, the Under Secretary of the Air 
Force, as the Department of Defense Space Milestone Decision Authority, identifies four 
types of systems (DoD, 2004).  These types of systems are sufficiently different from 
each other so as to require modified acquisition approaches.  The different types of 
systems are 1) space based, 2) ground based, 3) satellite launch vehicle systems, and 4) 
user equipment.  The NSSAP 03-01 document also places much more emphasis on 
systems engineering: “Robust [Systems Engineering] is essential to the success of any 
program.  Program offices must focus attention on the application of SE principles and 
practices throughout the system life cycle, and they must elevate these SE principles to a 
level commensurate with other programmatic considerations such as cost and schedule” 
{emphasis not in original} (DoD, 2004). 
In addition to recognizing these different types of systems, and therefore allowing 
greater flexibility in the acquisition system approach, NSSAP 03-01 also provides revised 
acquisition process acquisition frameworks for these differing types of systems – a small 
quantity program, a large quantity production program, and a revised process for 
evolutionary acquisitions.  These acquisition frameworks are shown and described below 
in Figures 3, 4, and 5. 
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Figure 3.   Small Quantity Model (From NSSAP 03-01) 
The first of these alternative acquisition frameworks is the “Small Quantity 
System Model” shown in Figure 3.  This framework typically would be applied to 
systems that are of the first three types according to NSSAP 03-01.  Because these 
acquisitions are typically of low-quantity and high-cost, the initial activities are allowed 
greater time to mature.  The initial design work in Phase B is of longer duration and takes 
place later than in the standard NSSAP model.  The Phase C decision point happens 
much later in the process. 
The second of these alternative acquisition frameworks is for a large quantity 
acquisition and is called the “Large Quantity Production Focused System Model.”  As 
shown in Figure 4, this acquisition framework from NSSAP 03-01 more closely 
resembles the typical DoDI 5000.2 framework and would apply to systems that would 
includes large quantities of production units, such as ground user equipment.  Although 
this framework closely resembles the overall DoDI 5000.2 framework, this large quantity 
acquisition process from NSSAP 03-01 provides additional focus (compared to the DoDI 
5000.2 framework) on requirements and testing. 
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Figure 4.   Large Quantity Model (From NSSAP 03-01) 
Finally, the third variation of the NSSAP 03-01 acquisition model specifically 
applies to evolutionary acquisitions, shown in Figure 5.  This alterative approach includes 
the necessary tie-in to an upgrade process (i.e., upgrade decision shown in the middle of 
Phase C).  Additionally, this evolutionary process can be utilized with any initial 
framework as described in the previous section.  Similar to the DoDI 5000.2 framework, 
the follow-on increments of capability would likely enter the process at Phase B 
(assuming a successful KDP). 
 
Figure 5.   Evolutionary Model (From NSSAP 03-01) 
Figure 6 shows one of the most critical pieces of information in the NSSAP 03-01 
− the “DOD SPACE MDA GUIDING PRINCIPLES.”  As part of this “streamlined, 
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tailorable” acquisition process, systems engineering is much more a prominent part of the 
acquisition process than in the DoD 5000 processes and is a key part of the first guiding 
principle, namely, Mission Success.  Overall, the Guiding Principles in Figure 6 from 
NSSAP 03-01 provide a solid grounding for systems engineers and acquisition managers 
of national security space programs and can be used by systems engineers to help define 
their role.  
4. DOD SPACE MDA GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Over the first fifty years of the history of space acquisitions, several enduring principles have emerged.  The 
following principles should be considered by all NSS members to set the tone and guide decision making in 
the acquisition of NSS systems: 
 
a.) Mission Success:  The overarching principle behind all National Security Space programs is 
mission success.  When acquiring space systems, mission success must be the first 
consideration when assessing the risks and trades among cost, schedule, and performance.  
Risk management, test planning, system engineering and funding profiles must be driven by 
this objective. 
  
b.) Accountability:  The acquisition execution chain is ultimately accountable for a program’s 
success or failure.  The SPD/PM, as the leader of the Government-Contractor team for a 
program, must be accountable and have the authority to accomplish the program’s objectives 
and meet the user’s needs.  The PEO or CAE and the DoD Space MDA have the 
responsibility to provide the SPD/PM with the resources and guidance necessary to 
accomplish these goals. 
 
c.) Streamlined / Agile:  The NSS acquisition team should work to reduce the acquisition 
decision cycle time and have short, clear lines of authority with decision making and 
program execution at the lowest levels possible.  Staff elements, at all levels, exist to advise 
the acquisition decision making principals (i.e., DoD Space MDA, PEO, CAE, SPD/PM).  
No more than two layers can be between the SPD/PM and the MDA.  (Ref: NSDD 219). 
 
d.) Inclusive:  Advice and information should be actively sought from all parties with an interest 
in NSS programs.  A collegial/team relationship among all government, academia, and 
industry partners is the goal.  DoD Space acquisition plans and documents should be 
coordinated with the appropriate lead user/operating command. 
 
e.) Flexible:  The “model” acquisition processes outlined in this document should be tailored to 
properly fit the circumstances of each NSS program.  Only those activities, reports, plans, 
coordinations, or reviews required by statute or directed by the NSS acquisition execution 
chain are required. 
 
f.) Stable:  Within a given acquisition increment stable budgets, stable requirements, stable 
direction, and low personnel turnover are necessary for successful program acquisition.  
Decisions made by the acquisition execution chain must be durable. 
 
g.) Disciplined:  All parties to this space acquisition policy must exercise the discipline 
necessary to achieve its goals without allowing its procedures to become unnecessarily 
burdensome and/or time consuming. 
 
h.) Credible:  The NSS team must deliver what it promises on schedule and within budget.  The 
NSS process is meant to incentivize and foster quality decision making for programs that 
exhibit the necessary maturity to proceed into the next acquisition phase. 
 
i.) Cost Realism:  The goal is to develop and grow a world class national security space cost 
estimating capability.  Cost estimates must be independent and accomplished in a timely, 
realistic, and complete manner.  Cost will be controlled by estimating accurately and 
focusing on quality to reduce rework and achieve mission success.  All members of the NSS 
acquisition execution chain must insist on, and protect, a realistic management reserve.  
Figure 6.   Guiding Principles (From NSSAP 03-01)  
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Because space systems are inherently different from terrestrial based systems, 
NSSAP 03-01 has attempted to provide a more flexible framework with additional 
emphasis on risk reduction, systems engineering and requirements definition.  The 
greater time in Phase C allows more complete testing prior to launch of the space 
vehicles.  This emphasis is important for space systems because of the peculiarities of 
satellite systems engineering that will be discussed later.   
E. SUMMARY 
No single organization or document monopolizes systems engineering expertise.  
Simply by virtue of organizational culture, different organizations will treat systems 
engineering differently.  As discussed thus far, the Space and Missile Systems Center 
takes a technical approach to defining the roles and responsibilities of a systems engineer 
and a systems engineering process.  Although SMC also acknowledges the importance of 
good systems engineering to overall program performance, SMC provides little formal 
direction for the systems engineer to influence the cost or schedule of the program. 
Within the Department of Defense, the core acquisition documents for DoD 
programs, DoDD 5000.1 and DoDI 5000.2 similarly lack any specific systems 
engineering direction or processes even though there is a direct acknowledgement of the 
importance of a “total systems approach” that includes technical performance.  In part, 
because of the importance of good systems engineering principles to space systems, the 
Milestone Decision Authority for space programs instituted a separate acquisition 
framework for National Security Space programs in 2003.  This policy, NSSAP 03-01, 
places significant emphasis on flexibility and systems engineering in order to attempt to 
more effectively and efficiently acquire space systems. 
The Space and Missile Systems Center has formally documented some of the 
peculiarities of space systems and emphasized the need for good systems engineering to 
account for the peculiarities.  This emphasis, combined with the flexible NSSAP 03-01 
framework, has the potential to provide a thorough and powerful systems engineering 
process for space systems and space system acquisition.  The crux of this research effort 
will attempt to discover and document trends in order to formulate recommendations on 
how the United States Air Force can improve its ability to effectively and efficiently 
acquire National Security Space systems. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The acquisition problems associated with developing space systems are not new.  
Neither are the general acquisition problems associated with developing any system for 
the Department of Defense.  According to Lance Lord (retired General, USAF, and 
former Commander, Air Force Space Command),  
The challenges we face have been around for longer than many of us 
realize.  We are not the only ones who have wrestled with the best way to 
acquire military systems.  In face, we have faced issues with acquiring 
high quality produces on time and on budget since the days of George 
Washington.  In the last 200 years, more than 900 GAO reports, a dozen 
major commissions, and 4,000 studies have set their sights on the topic of 
military systems acquisition.  Without question, we are dealing with an 
exacting and arduous issue.  (Lord, 2005) 
Although the pull for resources is a difficult problem in and of itself, as 
technology expands, dealing with the systems engineering required to develop and 
manage new systems has become a key factor in the acquisition process.  In history, 
armies could simply “live-off-the-land,” but today, as weaponry have become more 
complex and armies have grown larger and could reach farther from home, the ability to 
logistically support an army became more difficult.  With the advent of the Roman 
Legions, higher quality roadways were now needed to support troop movements.  As 
technology has continued to expand and become more complex – faster with each 
passing century, decade, and year – dedicated resources and processes have become more 
and more critical to success.  Never has this been more apparent than when the United 
States attempted to successfully launch and recover the classified Corona photo 
reconnaissance satellites.  Managed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the 
CORONA effort was ultimately a highly successful space reconnaissance program but, in 
the beginning, the first 13 launches were extremely expensive failures for a variety of 
reasons (Wild Black Yonder, 1998.) 
A problem in systems acquisition is that this process is just plain hard.  Balancing 
the three critical parameters of cost, schedule, and performance/capability in the midst of 
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struggling with policy and strategy decisions and competing programs is a difficult 
endeavor.  The Defense Department wants the best possible performance/capability as 
soon as possible.  The Congress wants the cost to be low in order to support many 
Defense and non-Defense programs.  In reality, although lots of ideas on “faster, better, 
cheaper” are tossed around, a program manager cannot have faster, better, and cheaper all 
at the same time because the three critical parameters are directly dependent on each 
other.  Something has to be fixed in order to achieve the overall program objective.  To 
date, the Congress and the Department of Defense have worked out a precarious balance 
by fixing yearly cost within the budget process.  One of the unfortunate drawbacks of this 
balancing act is that it allows the schedule to be continually delayed which leads to 
increasing total costs which can further delay the schedule. 
The remainder of this chapter contains a detailed investigation of the history of 
defense and space systems acquisition and engineering policy.  How have the evolving 
acquisition policies impacted the skill set of USAF systems engineering personnel and 
their ability to support the systems acquisition process?  Some of the peculiarities of 
space systems that make space systems engineering more difficult than traditional 
systems engineering will be elaborated and followed by a brief look at the Packard 
Commission of 1986, the acquisition reform initiatives of the mid-to-late 1990’s, the 
2001 Space Commission Report, the 2003 Young Panel, and the 2005 Defense 
Acquisition Performance Assessment Project.  Each of these initiatives has impacted, 
both positively and negatively, the ability of United States Air Force personnel to do their 
jobs in systems engineering in support of space systems acquisition.  This chapter ends 
with a brief examination of a few programs that have been deemed by history to be either 
successful or not-so-successful. 
B. PECULIARITIES OF SPACE SYSTEMS 
One of the primary distinctions between a satellite and a traditional Earth-bound 
system is the satellite must operate in a much harsher environment and must be error-free 
before launch.  The launch aspect is critically important because, in large part, it drives 
the normally exorbitant cost of fielding space systems.  However, space programs are not 
just driven by a different funding-profile; rather there are severe technical challenges 
present for a space program that do not exist for a general acquisition.  Primarily, these 
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challenges result from the space environment, unattended operation in orbit, and the 
inherent joint-nature of space programs (SMC).  According to the United States Air Force 
military standard (MIL-STD-1809) “Space Environment for USAF Space Vehicles,” 
“vehicles operating in the space environment experience various effects caused by the 
vacuum, radiation, and particulate environments, as well as inertial effects” (Department 
of the Air Force, 1991).   
A satellite must be designed to not only survive, but also to operate reliably in the 
harsh orbital environment.  The satellite deals with near-total vacuum, extreme and 
rapidly variable thermal conditions/cycles, as well as radiation and magnetic fields not 
present on Earth.  The systems engineering process must account for the derived 
requirements relating to the harsh orbital environment as well as the test and integration 
requirements of such stringent aspects of system design (SMC, 2005). 
A space system must also be capable of unattended operation.  This requires the 
program office to “get it right before launch.”  That is, however, not the only 
requirement.  Because the space system will be unattended, sufficient hardware and 
software redundancy must exist to provide sufficient margin to meet reliability 
requirements.  Moreover, the space system software should be re-loadable, on-orbit, to 
the maximum extent possible to allow for system anomaly resolution, which, for 
hardware, is simply not feasible without redundancy.  Overall, a robust space system 
capability requires many unique considerations:  the use of high reliability parts, 
extensive modeling and simulation, reduction/elimination of single-point-failure items, 
and higher design margins, just to name a few.  “Experience shows that the cost of these 
steps together with the cost of space launch [i.e., getting the system to space] is perhaps 
ten times or more the cost of comparable hardware deployed in terrestrial applications” 
(SMC, 2005). 
The extraordinary cost premium of space equipment means that each system must 
be exploited to the maximum extent possible “by all land, sea, and air forces” (SMC, 
2005).  This mentality places a great deal of pressure on all space systems to be joint-
service in nature.  This joint acquisition mind-set leads to difficulties in communications 
and processes as well as system interoperability (design, verification and test).  Also, 
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because these space systems will likely be exploited by a large number of end-users, the 
cost of the user equipment on the ground can “rival or even exceed” the cost of satellites, 
so the task of balancing system-level risk, performance/capability, cost and schedule is 
fundamentally more difficult, yet more critical than terrestrial based systems (SMC, 
2005). 
C. SPACE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION POLICY REVIEW 
1. History of Space Systems Acquisition 
Prior to the creation of the first NSSAP 03-01, there was no official difference 
between space systems acquisition and traditional Department of Defense systems 
acquisition.  Before the Air Force Space Command’s initiative to create a space cadre, 
there was no distinction in training for space system engineering or acquisition personnel 
as opposed to systems engineering or acquisition personnel within the rest of the Air 
Force.  Today, even with the advent of the AFSPC’s space cadre initiative, there is no 
recognizable distinction in career field for a space systems engineer.  The following 
reports, commissions, and efforts have been reviewed because they have all left a lasting 
impact on space systems engineering and therefore space systems acquisition.  Not all of 
these impacts were intentional, and not all were necessarily for the betterment of space 
systems engineering.  The findings resulting from the review of theses reports, 
commissions, and efforts will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
2. Packard Commission 
The President [former-President Ronald Reagan] established the Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management in part because public 
confidence in the effectiveness of the defense acquisition system has been 
shaken by a spate of ‘horror stories’—overpriced spare parts, test 
deficiencies, and cost and schedule overruns…  A major task of this 
Commission has been to evaluate the defense acquisition system, to 
determine how it might be improved, and to recommend changes that can 
lead to the acquisition of military equipment with equal or greater 
performance but at lower cost and with less delay.  (Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management, 1986) 
This Commission, chaired by David Packard, focused on defense acquisition practices 
and on how to reduce the cycle-time of developing major weapon systems. 
The Packard Commission concluded that the defense acquisition process was 
fraught with “basic problems that must be corrected” (Blue Ribbon Commission on 
27 
Defense Management, 1986).  These problems “are deeply entrenched and have 
developed over several decades from an increasingly bureaucratic and overregulated 
process.”  According to the Commission, the end result caused by these basic problems is 
weapon systems will cost too much, take too long, and not perform as required.  The 
following excerpts from the Packard Commission’s Formula for Action show how 
similar defense acquisition in 1986 is to the space systems acquisition environment of 
today.   
In general, we discovered, these problems were seldom the result of fraud 
or dishonesty.  Rather they were symptomatic of other underlying 
problems that affect the entire acquisition system. 
Once military requirements are defined, the next step is to assemble a 
small team whose job is to define a weapon system to meet these 
requirements, and “market” the system within the government, in order to 
get funding authorized for its development.  Such marketing takes place in 
a highly competitive environment, which is desirable because we want 
only the best ideas to survive and be funded.  It is quite clear, however, 
that this competitive environment for program approval does not 
encourage realistic estimates of cost and schedule.  So, all too often, when 
a program finally receives budget approval, it embodies not only 
overstated requirements but also underestimated costs. 
DoD then invites industry to bid on the program…  This [the environment 
of cost competition] effectively forecloses one principal factor—trade-offs 
between performance and cost—on which the competition should be 
based.  The resulting competition, based instead principally on cost, all too 
often goes to the contractor whose bid is the most optimistic. 
In underbidding, contractors assume there will be an opportunity later in a 
program to negotiate performance trade-offs that make a low bid 
achievable, or to recover understated costs through engineering change 
orders. 
In the face of these daunting problems, DoD selects a successful bidder 
and launches the program.  The DoD program manager sets out to 
accomplish the improbable task of managing his overspecified and 
underfunded program to a successful conclusion. 
But what was merely improbable soon becomes impossible.  The program 
manager finds that, far from being the manager of the program, he is 
merely one of the participants who can influence it.  An army of advocates 
for special interests descends on the program to ensure that it complies 
with various standards for… reliability, maintainability, operability, small 
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and minority business utilization, and competition, to name a few.  Each 
of these advocates can demand that the program manager take or refrain 
from taking some action, but none of them has any responsibility for the 
ultimate cost, schedule, or performance of the program. 
None of the purposes they advocate is undesirable in itself.  In the 
aggregate, however, they leave the program manager no room to balance 
their many demands, some of which are in conflict with each other, and 
most of which are in conflict with the program’s cost and schedule 
objectives.  Even more importantly, they produce a diffusion of 
management responsibility, in which everyone is responsible, and no one 
is responsible. 
Meanwhile, throughout this process, various committees of Congress are 
involved.  During the marketing phase, it is not enough for the program 
manager to sell the program to his Service leaders and the various staffs in 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  He also must sell the program to at 
least four committees and to numerous subcommittees of Congress, and 
then resell it for each fiscal year it is considered.  In so doing, the program 
manager is either assisted or opposed by a variety of contractors, each 
advocating its own views of the program on Capitol Hill.  While 
congressmen have an abstract interest in greater program effectiveness, 
they also have an intense pragmatic interest in their own constituencies.  
These two interests are frequently in conflict, as they exert pressure on 
specific programs through legislative oversight. 
All of these pressures, both internal and external to DoD, cause the 
program manager to spend most of his time briefing his program.  In 
effect, he is reduced to being a supplicant for, rather than a manager of, his 
program.  The resulting huckster psychology does not condition the 
program manager to search for possible inconsistencies between 
performance and schedule, on the one hand, and authorized funding, on 
the other.  Predictably, there is a high incidence of cost overruns on major 
weapon systems programs. 
This description of the acquisition system is stark, but it by no means 
exaggerates the environment of many, if not most, defense programs.  
Given this pernicious set of underlying problems, it is a tribute to the 
dedication of many professionals in the system, both in and out of DoD, 
that more programs do not end up in serious trouble.  (Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management, 1986) 
To combat the basic underlying problems of the acquisition process, the Packard 
Commission studied several models of success and made several recommendations based 
on its findings.  The Commission looked at the IBM 360 computer, the Boeing 767, and 
the Hughes communications satellite.  These programs were selected because the 
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Commission determined they were comparable in “complexity and size” to a typical 
major weapon system for the DoD.  Each of these programs took roughly half as long to 
develop as a major weapon system.  The Commission also investigated several DoD 
efforts that were managed under what it called “streamlined procedures.”  These efforts 
included the Polaris missile, Minuteman missile, Air Launched Cruise Missile, and 
several “highly classified projects.”  The Commission found these DoD programs were 
able to meet acquisition cycles roughly equivalent to the non-DoD efforts noted above.  
After looking at the similarities of each of these efforts, the Packard Commission listed 
six characteristics they all had in common: 1) clear command channels, 2) stability, 3) 
limited reporting requirements, 4) small, high-quality staffs, 5) communication with 
users, and 6) prototyping and testing.  Based on these findings, the Commission made 
seven recommendations to improve DoD weapon system acquisition: 
• Streamline Acquisition Organization and Procedures 
• Use Technology to Reduce Cost 
• Balance Cost and Performance 
• Stabilize Programs 
• Expand the Use of Commercial Products 
• Increase the Use of Competition 
• Enhance the Quality of Acquisition Personnel 
The effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the Packard Commission’s 
recommendations will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
3. Acquisition Reform 
The Acquisition Reform initiatives of the 1990’s are different from the Packard 
Commission, the Space Commission, and the Young Panel to be discussed later.  While 
each of the Commissions/Panels was a concerted study of the health and status of the 
then-present DoD acquisition system, the acquisition reform initiatives were a series of 
efforts spanning most of the decade to enact sweeping change and commercial practices 
in the DoD acquisition system.  The Defense Science Board (DSB) conducted a number 
of studies from 1993 through 1999 to make several recommendations.  Though not all 
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were enacted, the reform environment of the 1990’s created profound cultural changes 
throughout the entire DoD acquisition system.  The following description provides a 
general overview of the DSB reports on this topic through the years of 1993 - 1999. 
In 1993, the first DSB report on acquisition reform was published and provided to 
the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition).  This report was not based solely on 
reducing the cost of the acquisition process, rather, it set out to investigate and provide 
recommendations regarding how to “reconnect and integrate defense acquisition with the 
commercial workplace from which it has been drifting apart at a steady rate” (Defense 
Science Board, 1993).  The DSB focused on the following issues: 
• Major barriers to the use of commercial practices, facilities, and 
equipment 
• Primary sources of excessive costs in the current acquisition process 
• Lack of flexibility, reality, and affordability in the current program 
definition process (or requirements process) 
• Need to ensure public trust while implementing improvements 
In the DSB’s research, the use of commercial best practices, broad use of 
competition instead of rigid cost controls, and flexibility in the requirements process were 
all emphasized.  The following specific recommendations were intended to bring about 
these changes: 
• Broaden the procurement of commercial products 
• Increase the use of simplified procurement procedures 
• Reduce reliance on cost or pricing data 
Additionally, the DSB recommended an increased use of commercial practices in 
what it called ‘key industrial sectors.’  These key industrial sectors included: 
• Pilot initiatives (electronics and jet engines) to utilize commercial 
practices for new procurements 
• Focus on technology insertion and requirements process  
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• Prepare the first of an annual series of commercialization plans to 
implement commercial practices 
• Establish an outside standing Review Group 
• Establish a comprehensive education, training, communications, and 
outreach program for government, industry, and the public 
A little more than one year later, the DSB conducted and released the second 
phase of defense acquisition reform initiatives, known as Phase II.  The primary focus of 
this Phase II study was to further define and determine the feasibility of the pilot industry 
initiatives that were recommended in the Phase I study (Defense Science Board, 1994).  
In Phase II, the DSB concluded: 
• Mature jet engines, microelectronics, software, and space systems can and 
should be procured and supported in a fully commercial environment. 
• The combatant commanders should be given increased technical cadres to 
further their capability to participate in the requirements process. 
• It is feasible to eliminate many of the barriers to adoption of commercial 
practices without sacrificing the public trust in spending public funds. 
Although numerous specific recommendations were provided, the primary 
conclusion of the Phase II study was the feasibility to press forward with 
commercialization initiatives.  The DSB Task Force recommended the establishment of 
comprehensive programs to begin commercializing key industries where possible (jet 
engines, microelectronics and mature space efforts) as well as follow-up studies to 
investigate the ability to fully commercialize large-scale research and development 
efforts (including space).  Furthermore, a renewed emphasis on competition, a reduction 
of standards and regulations, as well as operational influence on the requirements process 
were all key tenants of the Phase II study. 
The “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Acquisition 
Reform (Phase III)” was released in mid-1996.  In Phase III, this Task Force focused on 
“evaluating the possibility of extending best-of-class practices to the research and 
development phase of a system’s acquisition” (Defense Science Board, 1996).  The key 
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findings from Phase III continued to support the initial findings of the Phase I study.  
“The current acquisition process is outmoded, too expensive, too lengthy, and should be 
replaced; instead, the research and development phase of military systems should adopt 
best commercial practices.”  Additionally, the conclusions from Phase III again 
emphasized the need for increased operational involvement with the requirements process 
and the use of a competitive environment instead of a cost-type environment for 
development programs.  The Task Force recommended the following specific measures 
to begin implementing a commercialized research and development environment: 
• A broader understanding and implementation of effective and continuous 
competition 
• Carefully structured, relatively short, fixed price/flexible performance 
contracts 
• A rigorous risk-reduction phase before full system development 
• Including contractor past performance on commercial and military 
programs and on process maturity as significant factors in source selection 
• The participation of government representatives on the integrated product 
teams 
• Curtailing efforts early when performance fails or cost objectives are not 
achieved 
• Buying in quantity only after system demonstration and user buy-off 
This type of a “phased, competitive model” to research and development “will 
permit DoD to develop and acquire weapons systems faster, better, and at lower cost” 
(Defense Science Board, 1996). 
Published in 1999, a fourth study report (Phase IV) recommended a set of metrics 
by which to measure the initiatives put forth in the previous Task Force reports.  The 
effectiveness, or lack thereof, of these reform initiatives will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
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4. Space Commission 
Directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public 
Law 106-65) to assess the organization and management of space activities that support 
U.S. national security interests, the Space Commission delivered its report on 11 January 
2001.  The Commission’s charter, not just limited to or even focused on a review of 
national security space acquisition, was to undertake a holistic review of the national 
security space strategy, vulnerability, and approach for the future.  Though space systems 
engineering/acquisition is just one small facet of this commission’s charter, a review of 
this Commission is included as part of this research effort, because some of the 
conclusions and recommendations by this Commission were then an admonition of the 
space acquisition community in general. 
The 2001 Space Commission “unanimously concluded that organizational and 
management changes are needed.”  This shake-up of the national security space 
community was deemed necessary because of the key findings by the Commission.  All 
five of the Commission’s key findings include criticism of the United States 
Government’s handling of national security space and, in some manner; each of them 
pertains to space systems acquisition.   
“First, the present extent of U.S. dependence on space, the rapid pace at which 
this dependence is increasing and the vulnerabilities it creates, all demand that U.S. 
national security space interests be recognized as a top national security priority…  Only 
the President has the authority, first, to set forth the national space policy, and then to 
provide the guidance and direction to senior officials, which together are needed to 
ensure that the United States remains the world’s leading space-faring nation.”  Though 
not a direct criticism of the lower level acquisition organizations, this finding bluntly 
provides warning that our nation is vulnerable to a “Space Pearl Harbor” and it will 
require action from the President of the United States to make space be a part of the U.S. 
national security as is required. 
“Second, the U.S. Government—in particular, the Department of Defense and the 
Intelligence Community—is not yet arranged or focused to meet the national security 
space needs of the 21st century.  Our growing dependence on space, our vulnerabilities in 
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space and burgeoning opportunities from space are simply not reflected in the present 
institutional arrangements…”  This is one of the most poignant indictments of the space 
engineering/acquisition community and directly calls in to question the community’s 
ability to meet the space needs for today and the future. 
“Third, U.S. national security space programs are vital to peace and stability, and 
the two officials primarily responsible and accountable for those programs are the 
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence…  They must work closely 
and effectively together, in partnership, both to set and maintain the course for national 
security space programs and to resolve the differences that arise between their respective 
bureaucracies.”  With this finding, the commission calls into question the ability of the 
highest levels of the national security space bureaucracy to provide the capabilities and 
information required “to pursue our deterrence and defense objectives in this complex, 
changing and still dangerous world.” 
“Fourth, we know from history that every medium—air, land and sea—has seen 
conflict.  Reality indicates that space will be no different…  Thus far… the U.S. has not 
yet taken the steps necessary to develop the needed capabilities and to maintain and 
ensure continuing superiority.”  This finding is also not a direct criticism of the 
engineering/acquisition process, yet it serves as a warning that the community needs to be 
ready to develop and delivery the needed capabilities when called upon to do so. 
“Finally, investment in science and technology resources – not just facilities, but 
people – is essential if the U.S. is to remain the world’s leading space-faring nation.  The 
U.S. Government needs to play an active, deliberate role in expanding and deepening the 
pool of military and civilian talent in science, engineering and systems operations that the 
nation will need.”  According to the Commission’s report, this is one of the fundamental 
problems in dealing with the high tech world of space:  growing the right people to do the 
right jobs when needed. 
Although all five of these findings do contain criticism of and/or warnings to the 
space engineering/acquisition community, the second and fifth findings are particularly 
accurate.  Later, the Commission states “The U.S. will not remain the world’s leading 
space-faring nation by relying on yesterday’s technology to meet today’s requirements at 
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tomorrow’s prices.”  To address these findings and this problem inherent in the 
development and fielding of national security space systems, the Space Commission put 
forth several areas for improvement.  “The U.S. Government must work actively to make 
sure that the nation has the means necessary to advance its interests in space.  This 
requires action in the following areas: 
• Transform U.S. Military Capabilities 
• Strengthen Intelligence Capabilities 
• Shape International Legal and Regulatory Environment 
• Advance U.S. Technological Leadership 
• Create and Sustain a Cadre of Space Professionals” 
One of the overarching recommendations of the Space Commission to address the 
shortfalls noted above was to lay the foundation for the emergence of a Space Corps 
within the Department of the Air Force or a Department of Space distinct from the other 
military departments.  The Commission stated: 
The Department of Defense requires space systems that can be employed 
in independent operations or in support of air, land and sea forces to deter 
and defend against hostile actions directed at the interests of the United 
States.  In the mid term, a Space Corps within the Air Force may be 
appropriate to meet this requirement; in the longer term, it may be met by 
a military department for space.  In the nearer term, a realigned, 
rechartered Air Force is best suited to organize, train and equip space 
forces.  (Space Commission, 2001). 
Towards this end the Commission provided the following specific recommendations. 
• Realign the Space and Missile Systems Center under a 4-star General in 
command of Air Force Space Command.  At the time of this 
recommendation, the Space and Missile Systems Center was assigned to 
the Air Force Materiel Command and was responsible for the research, 
development and fielding of all space systems developed by the United 
States Air Force. 
• Amend Title 10 U.S.C. to add the phrase “and space” to the responsibility 
of the United States Air Force.  This would assign, by statute, 
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responsibility to organize, train and equip space forces to the United States 
Air Force. 
The Commission also made several specific recommendations to bring about a 
closer alignment of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the Air Force.  These 
recommendations were intended to bring about a more streamlined acquisition process 
for national security space programs and foster the sharing of “best practices” between 
the Air Force and the NRO. 
• Align Air Force and NRO space programs by designating the Under-
Secretary of the Air Force as the Director, NRO. 
• Designate the Air Force as the Executive Agent for Space.  This action 
would create a single acquisition agent for all Department of Defense 
space acquisitions. 
The Commission concluded that “the Department of Defense is not yet on a 
course to develop the space cadre the nation needs.  The Department must create a 
stronger military space culture, through focused career development, education and 
training, within which the space leaders for the future can be developed.”  The combined 
recommendations to realign the SMC to AFSPC and designate the USecAF as Director of 
the NRO not only provide a foundation for the Space Commissions mid-term solution of 
a Space Corps, but these recommendations also provide the underpinning for the creation 
and sustainment of “a cadre of space professionals.”  By consolidating all space 
acquisition and operations activities under a 4-star Commander, Air Force Space 
Command, a single organization led by a single commander, can be put in charge of 
“managing all aspects of the space career field” and made responsible for creating “an 
environment in which to develop a cadre of space professionals… charged with 
developing doctrine, concepts of operations and new systems to achieve national space 
goals and objectives.  The arrangement would increase the role of the uniformed military 
in research, development and acquisition of space systems to better meet operational 
requirements.” 
The effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the Space Commission’s recommendations 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
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5. Young Panel 
Significant cost growth and schedule delays in many critical space system 
programs have caused senior DoD and Intelligence Community leadership 
to question our nation’s ability to acquire and sustain national security 
space systems.  The recent series of problems comes at a time when our 
nation has been growing increasingly reliant on space systems to perform 
military and intelligence operations.  (Defense Science Board, 2003) 
In August 2002, then-Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
[USecDef(ATL)] E.C. “Pete” Aldridge, then-Secretary of the Air Force James Roche, 
and then-Undersecretary of the Air Force/Director of the NRO (DNRO) Peter Teets 
chartered the Defense Science Board Task Force on Acquisition of National Security 
Space Programs.  This Task Force was “asked to investigate systemic issues related to 
space systems acquisition, to include all aspects from requirements definition and 
budgetary planning through staffing and program execution; and to recommend 
improvements to the acquisition of space programs from initiation to deployment.”   
Within the Terms of Reference Memorandum, establishing the Task Force by 
then-USecDef(ATL) E.C. “Pete” Aldridge, the state of national security space systems 
acquisition is described very bleakly: 
The health of our Nation’s ability to acquire and sustain national security 
space systems has become a serious question with the top leaders in the 
Department of Defense in the wake of significant cost growths and 
schedule delays for many critical space systems procurements.  This 
concern about the acquisition of national security space systems comes at 
a time when our nation is growing increasingly reliant on space systems 
for both military and intelligence operations.  We need to think 
strategically about the vulnerabilities arising from this dependency and 
whether we are becoming too dependent on space.  In order to characterize 
the problem it is necessary to understand the underlying causes of the 
community’s problem and identify any systemic issues. 
At the conclusion of their efforts, the Task Force did indeed find significant 
systemic issues in the national security space acquisition process.  The Task Force found 
five primary reasons for cost growth and schedule delays: 
• Cost has replaced mission success as the primary driver in managing space 
development programs. 
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• Unrealistic estimates lead to unrealistic budgets and unexecutable 
programs. 
• Undisciplined definition and uncontrolled growth in system requirements 
increase cost and schedule delays. 
• Government capabilities to lead and manage the space acquisition process 
have seriously eroded. 
• Industry has failed to implement proven practices on some programs. 
The Young Panel put forth these reasons for cost and schedule problems in 
national security space acquisition against the backdrop of significant changes in the 
1990’s.  According to the Young Panel, the following changes took place in the 1990’s in 
the national security space environment: 
• Declining acquisition budgets 
• Acquisition reform with significant unintended consequences 
• Increased acceptance of risk 
• Unrealized growth of a commercial space market 
• Increased dependence on space by an expanding user base 
• Consolidation of the space industrial base 
These changes took place because the entire Department of Defense was 
attempting to make the transition from “the structured cold war environment to the more 
global and unpredictable threat environment we see today.”  In order to correct some of 
the problems created by this changing environment, the Young Panel made several 
specific recommendations for immediate implementation.  These specific 
recommendations are: 
• Mission Success should be established by the USecAF/DNRO as the 
“guiding principle in all space systems acquisition.” {emphasis in 
original} 
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• The Secretary of Defense should provide the USecAF the same authority 
for implementing DoD space programs as the DNRO has for 
implementing the National Reconnaissance Program budget. 
• The USecAF/DNRO should help ensure realistic budgets and cost 
estimates. 
• The USecAF/DNRO should only compete space systems acquisitions 
“when clearly in the best interest of the government and provisions “must 
be made to assure continuity between the legacy system and the new 
system.” {emphasis in original} 
• The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence should 
designate senior leaders with the authority to lead and assess requirements 
processes and couple the requirements with funding constraints. 
• The program managers should be allowed to control their own programs 
within a USecAF/DNRO approved baseline and be allowed to trade 
requirements throughout the program. 
• “The Commander, Air Force Space Command, should complete the 
ongoing effort to establish a dedicated career field for space operations 
and acquisition personnel.” 
• Key program management positions should be linked to a minimum tour-
length of four years. 
• The USecAF/DNRO should more clearly define the “responsibility, 
authority, and accountability for program managers, recognizing the 
criticality of program managers to the success of their programs.” 
• The USecAF/DNRO should “develop a robust systems engineering 
capability” by reestablishing an “organic government systems engineering 
capability” and more fully utilizing the “combined capabilities of 
government, Federally Funded Research and Development Center 
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(FFRDC), and systems engineering and technical assistance (SETA) 
system engineering resources.” 
• Program managers should be required to identify and report problems 
early by establishing early warning metrics and “severe and prominent 
penalties should follow any attempt to suppress problem reporting.” 
• National security space contractors should be required to account for the 
quality of their program and for mission success, identify and use best 
program management and engineering practices and be accountable for 
early identification of problems. 
• Contract and fee structures should be aligned “to focus industry attention 
on proven management and engineering practices and mission success.” 
In putting forth these specific recommendations, the Young Panel hoped to 
correct the problems it noted and allow the national security space acquisition system to 
focus on producing the required systems.  The Young Panel also noted that further cost 
and schedule overruns would assure mission failures if the actions were not taken to 
correct the current problems.  Finally, the Young Panel stated that even “if all of the 
corrections recommended in this report are made, national security space will remain a 
challenging endeavor, requiring the nation’s most competent acquisition personnel, both 
in government and industry.” 
6. Teal Group  
In late 2005, the Teal Group was asked to answer the following question: “Is there 
something inherent in military satellite technologies that makes them prone to technical 
setbacks and cost increases?”  The Teal Group’s findings were published in Aerospace 
America in January 2006.  Their leading conclusion states “Whether or not cost overruns 
are inherent in U.S. military satellites under development, we cannot say for sure.  We 
can say that these overruns seem to be endemic” (Cáceres, 2006).  As part of its research, 
the Teal Group studied 10 “major satellite systems” under development by the 
Department of Defense.  The following programs and their descriptions from the Teal 
Group’s investigation are incorporated here.. 
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Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF).  This program is intended to be 
the follow-on to the USAF MILSTAR military communications system. 
Future Imagery Architecture (FIA).  This program is intended to follow the 
National Reconnaissance Office’s electro-optical and radar imaging surveillance and 
reconnaissance satellites. 
Global Positioning System (GPS) IIR-M/IIF.  The GPS IIR-M and GPS-IIF 
efforts comprise a “piece-meal” modernization program for GPS-IIR. 
GPS-III.  GPS-III is intended to be the “full-fledged” modernization for the entire 
GPS constellation. 
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS).  This is a U.S. Navy (USN) program and 
is intended to be the eventual replacement of the current USN constellation of 
communications satellites (Navy Fleet Satellite). 
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (N-POESS).  
N-POESS is a combined effort between the USAF and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  It is intended to be the follow-on to the current 
USAF Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) and the NOAA Polar 
Operational Environmental Satellites (POES). 
Space Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High).  This system is intended to be 
the “geostationary orbiting segment of a two-tiered ballistic missile early-warning 
satellite constellation” and makes up one piece of the follow-on to the Defense Support 
Program (DSP). 
Space Radar (SR).  This is the third iteration of a program formerly called Starlite 
in 1996 and then Discoverer II in 1997.  It is intended to provide a radar reconnaissance 
capability. 
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS).  Along with SBIRS-High, STSS 
helps complete the follow-on to the DSP.  STSS is intended to be a constellation of 
missile tracking satellites in low-earth-orbit.  It is the successor of two previously 
cancelled programs – Brilliant Eyes from the 1980’s and more recently SBIRS-Low. 
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Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS).  WGS is intended to augment the USAF 
Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) and the USN Global Broadcast 
Service (GBS). 
A quick run-down of the Teal Group’s primary conclusions from each one of 
these programs gives the best snap-shot of the current state of national security space 
acquisitions and is shown in Table 1. 
Cost Schedule
Overrun Delay
Cancelled and re-named twice since 1996; latest iteration was almost
200% over budget when cancelled
Cancelled and re-named twice since 1980's; latest iteration was




Launch delays; program restructures
4 "Nunn-McCurdy" violations; 2 in a single year
Technology demonstration cancelled; reduction in deployed capability
Budget increased early on; continually being stretched out
Costly "modernization" program required
Fewer satellites built / deployed
Numerous "restructures"





Design and integration delays
Technology delays
Unclear requirements; technology





~ 2 yearsAt RiskWGS
STSS At Risk -
At Risk
~3 years-MUOS





Table 1. Teal Group Program Summary 
The Teal Group’s survey of national security space program troubles is certainly 
not the only current indicator that the space acquisition process is still in trouble.  
Although the Teal Group did not offer any specific recommendations on correcting the 
“endemic problems” they identified, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment 
(DAPA) Project from the same timeframe did.  The DAPA Project’s assessment of the 
current status of space acquisition and its recommendations will be discussed in the next 
section. 
7. Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project 
In June 2005, acting Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England “authorized a 
sweeping and integrated assessment to consider ‘every aspect’ of acquisition.”  The 
authorization led to the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) Project.  
At the time, during Mr. England’s confirmation hearings, it became clear that the 
“Congress and Department of Defense senior leadership have lost confidence in the 
Acquisition System’s ability to determine what needs to be procured or to predict with 
any degree of accuracy what things will cost, when they will be delivered, or how they 
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will perform” (Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment 
Project [DAPA], 2005).  According to the DAPA Executive Summary, the Fiscal Year 
2006 House and Senate Defense Authorization Committee Reports issued concern over 
the DoD’s acquisition system’s ability to produce and procure required capabilities 
within reasonable cost.  Additionally, the Committee reports “stated that addressing 
symptoms one program or one process at a time is unlikely to result in substantial 
improvement” (DAPA). 
The DAPA Project produced the following major findings shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.   DAPA Project Major Findings (From DAPA) 
The DAPA Project also concluded that the net effect of “incremental 
improvements to a narrowly defined acquisition process” over the last few decades of 
acquisition reform initiatives has been detrimental to the DoD acquisition system.  
Because the acquisition system relies on external processes and organizations (i.e., 
“oversight, budget and requirements” as well as the parent organizations of these 
processes), in order for the reform initiatives studied by the DAPA Project to have been 
effective the external processes and organizations would have to have been stable – 
which they were not (DAPA, 2005). 
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Although the purpose of the DAPA Project was not to deal specifically with space 
systems acquisition or engineering, many of the DAPA recommendations apply to the 
entire realm of DoD acquisition and the Air Force led space systems acquisition.  The 
DAPA Project recommended an “integrated transformation of the major elements of the 
larger Acquisition System that can reduce cost, enhance acquisition performance and 
accelerate by years the delivery of key capabilities” by reducing “government-induced 
instability” (DAPA, 2005).  Figure 8 summarizes these recommendations. 
 
Figure 8.   DAPA Project Recommendations (From DAPA) 
These recommendations reflected the DAPA Project focus on stability – stability 
in funding, stability in requirements, and stability in process.  Furthermore, the DAPA 
Project emphasized the “value [of] the acquisition workforce” and recommended it be 
rebuilt and leadership be encouraged..  These DAPA recommendations will also be 
addressed in Chapter IV.  
D. REVIEW OF PAST AIR FORCE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROGRAMS 
1. Successful Programs 
a. Discoverer/CORONA 
In August 1960, the film recovered from Discoverer XIV provided the 
first images of Earth ever taken from space (Wild Black Yonder).  Discoverer was the 
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unclassified cover story for the closely held Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) program 
code-named CORONA.  This first successful CORONA mission was a critical victory for 
the United States intelligence community.  This mission provided photographs covering 
over one million square miles of Soviet territory – “greater than that produced by all of 
the U-2 overflights over the Soviet Union” (Richelson). 
Because of its impacts on dispelling the “missile gap” and its many 
technological firsts, the Discoverer/CORONA program has been viewed as a very 
successful endeavor for the United States efforts in space.  According to the “Historical 
Overview of the Space and Missile Systems Center” by SMC, the most important aspect 
of the Discoverer/CORONA program was it “filled a crucial need” for the Eisenhower 
administration.  After the downing of Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, 
the administration ceased all airborne reconnaissance efforts over the Soviet Union and 
was effectively blind in regards to the real nature of the Soviet missile threat.  
Throughout the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, the Discoverer/CORONA program made 
the recovery of film capsules from space nearly routine and achieved numerous 
technological breakthroughs.  In addition to Discoverer XIV, these missions achieving 
technological breakthroughs included Discoverer I as the first polar orbiting satellite and 
Discoverer II as the first satellite “to be stabilized in orbit in all three axes, to be 
maneuvered on command from the earth, to separate a reentry vehicle on command, and 
to send its reentry vehicle back to earth”.  Later, the reentry capsule from Discoverer XIII 
was recovered from the Pacific Ocean to demonstrate the first recovery of a man-made 
object to be ejected from an orbiting satellite.  Finally, Discoverer XIV became the first  
CORONA mission to be successfully completed and was the first “aerial recovery of an 
object returned from orbit” as well as the first mission “to return film from orbit.  
Through these breakthroughs, the CORONA program inaugurated “the age of satellite 
reconnaissance.”  Even after the public launches of Discoverer missions ended (after 
Discoverer XXXVIII in 1962), the covert CORONA efforts continued to support the 
United States during the Cold War.  Ultimately, a total of 145 missions were launched 
that helped identify Soviet missile launch complexes and the Plesetsk Missile Test Range 
as well as provided information about what types and numbers of missiles the Soviet 
Union was developing, testing and fielding (Space and Missile Systems Center).  In fact, 
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the program was so successful that a companion USAF program called SAMOS (Satellite 
and Missile Observation System) was cancelled in 1962 in large part because CORONA 
was making it look easy (Wild Black Yonder). 
As easy as CORONA made launching satellites and recovering film look, 
and as successful as history now views the Discoverer/CORONA program, its beginning 
suffered from demise.   In fact, failure was the norm for the first 12 missions.  The first 
launch had to abort because its “upper-stage stabilization rockets fired prematurely.”  
Every launch between the first one and the successful Discoverer XIII failed.  Some 
failed because the rocket burn times were too short (leading to failure to achieve orbit) or 
too long (leading to an orbit too high for the use of the camera).  Others failed due to film 
problems (jamming, turning brittle, or turning to powder) (First Military & Spy Satellites, 
2005).  Others were unsuccessful because the recovery capsule failed (failure of the 
parachutes to deploy, rockets fired in the wrong direction resulting in going into a higher 
orbit instead of a reentry orbit, or failing to detach from the spacecraft) (Richelson, 
2002).  Due to the streak of failures, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., the CIA program manager 
for the CORONA effort, later commented that it “was a most heartbreaking business.  If 
an airplane goes on a test flight and something malfunctions, the pilot can tell you about 
the malfunction, and you can look it over and find out.  But in the case of a recce 
[reconnaissance] satellite, you fire the damned thing off and you’ve got some telemetry, 
and you never get it back.  There is no pilot of course, and you’ve got no hardware.  You 
never see it again.  You have to infer from telemetry what went wrong.  Then you make a 
fix, and if it fails again, you know you’ve inferred wrong” (Burrows, 1986).  After 
Discoverer XIII was successfully recovered from the ocean (albeit a mission with no 
camera on-board), the environment of failure was so prominent that Bissell’s assistant, 
Eugene Kiefer, sent a message saying “Congratulations on a random success” to the 
USAF officer in charge of procuring the Discoverer/CORONA boosters (Richelson, 
2002). 
Although it may have started as a failure prone program leading to a 
“random success,” the Discoverer/CORONA program is a critical achievement in our 
nation’s history.  Not only was it a successful program full of technological “firsts,” but 
as intended, the CORONA film recovery efforts were able to fill the void of overhead 
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aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union.  With the very first film recovery, CORONA 
began showing there were “far fewer ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles] than the 
Soviets claimed to have” and President Eisenhower was able to finally get the 
intelligence data he needed (First Military & Spy Satellites, 2005).  As such, 
Discoverer/CORONA is one space program that many people think of when thinking of a 
successful space program. 
b. Global Positioning System (GPS) 
The world’s first navigational satellite system was called Transit and was 
owned and operated by the U.S. Navy from the first satellite launch in 1960, through the 
last launch in 1988, and until the program’s cessation in 1996 (Earth Science & 
Commerce from Space, 2005).  Transit, as the world’s first space-based navigation 
system achieved full operational capability in 1968, just four years after initial 
operational capability.  It “used three operational satellites to produce signals whose 
Doppler effects and known positions allowed receivers – primarily ships and submarines 
– to calculate their positions in two dimensions.”  This system provided the technological 
foundation for navigation by satellite and “prepared military users to rely on such a 
system.”  In December 1996, even though several Transit satellites were still fully 
operational, the constellation was turned off to make room for a “newer, faster, and more 
accurate system” (SMC History). 
That system is the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System or GPS.  The 
GPS program is a joint program primarily lead and managed by the USAF via the Los 
Angeles based Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC).  According to SMC, all of the 
Department of Defense’s “navigation and position-finding missions are now performed 
by the Global Positioning System.  [GPS] consists of 24 operational satellites that 
broadcast navigation signals to the earth, a control segment that maintains the accuracy of 
the signals, and user equipment that receives and processes the signals.”  Then-Deputy 
Secretary of Defense William P. Clements authorized the start of the GPS program in 
1973.  In the beginning, GPS took advantage of two parallel programs that were on-going 
in the middle and late 1960’s in the field of space-based navigation.  These programs 
were called 621B and Timation.  GPS utilized a combination of these programs using the 
frequency and signal developments from 621B and the orbital concept for a medium 
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altitude constellation from Timation.  From 1973 to the mid-1990’s, GPS followed a 
traditional acquisition approach.  In 1994, the full constellation of 24 satellites was finally 
on orbit and a full operational capability was announced in April 1995.  Since that time, 
the GPS program has gone through an upgrade effort for GPS-IIR (R stands for 
“replacement”) and the next generation of GPS-III satellites (SMC History). 
The GPS program is widely viewed for its military success.  According to 
the National Geographic, “GPS has become the international standard for satellite 
navigation.  It is small wonder that GPS has become the primary operational method for 
commercial aviation navigation.  This revolutionary breakthrough in electronic 
positioning allows the military to have situational awareness right down to the individual 
solider and allows the precise navigation of weapons.  It allows spacecraft operators to 
know the precise orbital parameters of their satellites, and it supports an ever growing 
number of commercial, scientific, and civil users and their applications” (Earth Science & 
Commerce from Space, 2005).   
Perhaps even more than its military success is the tremendous success in 
the civilian sector that GPS has garnered.  As noted above there is an “ever growing 
number of commercial, scientific, and civil users and their applications.”  The following 
essay excerpt shows just how intertwined GPS has become in our every-day civilian 
lives. 
Back in the car, your cell phone rings and you turn down the radio to hear 
the message changing your plans.  Your cell phone is not in 
communication directly with a satellite – but the cell tower it connects to 
relies on precise timing information from the atomic clocks on the U.S. 
military’s Global Positioning System satellites. 
As you head to an unfamiliar part of town, it is reassuring to rely on the 
interactive navigational capability in your car, made possible by the GPS 
network.  Your car’s computer uses information from the GPS satellites to 
triangulate your position, then combines this information with maps in 
memory, or uses the cell phone network to request directions from an 
operator.  (Christensen, 2005) 
As described above, the GPS program is widely viewed as a highly 
successful application of USAF space expertise.  In addition to the wide range of GPS-
based civilian uses, GPS’ role in precision guided weapons during recent military 
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operations has added credence to this view.  However, as with Discoverer/CORONA, the 
GPS program is certainly not without its faults.  Though the NAVSTAR GPS program 
was started in the early 1970s, because of USAF funding priorities and other problems, 
by 1991, there were only 16 of the planned 24 satellites in orbit.  The full constellation of 
24 satellites and the full operational capability of GPS were not in place until 1994 (Wild 
Black Yonder, 1998).  As recent as the USAF efforts on GPS-III, schedule delays and 
cost overruns are common-place.  According to the Teal Group survey, both GPS IIR-
M/IIF and GPS-III are experiencing significant delays and cost growth as a result of 
“indecision on the part of the Air Force” (Cáceres, 2006). 
2. Struggling Programs 
The Space Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High) and Space Radar (SR) 
programs are “struggling programs,” for various reasons.  SBIRS-High was one of the 
focus programs in the Young Panel.  According to the Teal Group’s report, SBIRS-High 
“has experienced the highest cost overruns and the most significant technical problems” 
of all of the DoD’s satellite programs.  The Space Radar program is likewise noted in the 
Teal Group’s report as a program at risk due to the history of previous incarnations of the 
same program being troubled and ultimately cancelled.  Furthermore, as will be discussed 
in the Space Radar section, SR has faced the recent scrutiny of the GAO and 
Congressional leaders.   
a. Space Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High) 
The Space Based Infrared System-High “is a satellite system intended to 
provide missile warning information and to support the missile defense, technical 
intelligence, and battlespace characterization missions.  Intended to replace the Defense 
Support Program, it consists of four satellites (plus one spare) in geosynchronous earth 
orbit (GEO), two sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO), and associated 
fixed and mobile ground stations” (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2005).  In 
2003, the GAO investigated SBIRS-High on multiple occasions.  As part of the Defense 
Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs in 2003, the GAO documented 
significant cost, schedule and technology risks associated with SBIRS-High.  In that year, 
the SBIRS-High program had incurred a Nunn-McCurdy breach (a Congressional 
infraction of exceeding a cost projection by 25% or more) (GAO, 2003a).  Later in 2003, 
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the GAO concluded the SBIRS-High program still contained critical cost and schedule 
risks associated with technology development (GAO, 2003b).  In the 2005 Assessments 
of Selected Major Weapon Programs, the GAO documented the SBIRS-High program’s 
second Nunn-McCurdy violation (GAO, 2005).  As indicated by the Teal Group’s 
findings from 2005, the projected costs for SBIRS-High have continued to grow by more 
than 150% – from initial estimates less than $4 billion to current projections between 
$10-$12 billion – and have resulted in four Nunn-McCurdy violations.    Additionally, the 
original launch date for the first satellite was delayed from 2002 to 2009 (Cáceres, 2006).  
As of January 2006, SBIRS-High was recognized to still be in serious trouble.  At a 
conference sponsored by the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association 
(AFCEA), the commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 
LtGen Larry J. Dodgen, said “I have severe doubts on whether or not such capabilities” 
[i.e., SBIRS-High] will exist to support USA requirements and capabilities.  According to 
LtGen Dodgen, the current troubles in USAF space acquisition are having a “negative 
effect” on Army programs (i.e., the Army Future Combat System) (Tuttle, 2006). 
Acknowledging the severe cost and schedule problems that SBIRS-High is 
dealing with in trying to field this technology, the constellation for SBIRS-High has 
shrunk from the original plans for five operational GEO satellites and two operational 
payloads on HEO satellites.  Following the last Nunn-McCurdy review, Kenneth Krieg, 
USecDef(ATL) notified Congress “of the Pentagon’s decision to buy no more than three 
SBIRS-High satellites, with the third to be contingent on the performance of the first” 
(Singer, 2006).  And finally, although the first launch is still three years in the future, the 
USAF is already investigating plans to fill the shortfall of SBIRS-High with a different 
“parallel competitor program” called Overhead Non-Imaging Infrared (ONIR) in an 
effort to “generate competition and exploit new technologies” (Singer, 2006). 
As shown here, the SBIRS-High program has a long history of cost 
overruns.  Only the future will show whether or not SBIRS-High has a place in history 
along side Discoverer/CORONA and GPS as a successful program fraught with 
challenges or if it will fail to accomplish its stated mission.  
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b. Space Radar (SR) 
In April 1998, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), the NRO, and the USAF initiated a joint program called Discoverer II.  
Discoverer II was intended to provide a 24-satellite constellation of synthetic aperture 
radar imaging satellites (Discoverer II, 2006).  Although initiated in 1998, the Discoverer 
II program was not new.  In fact, it was planned upon the recently “shelved” program 
called STARLITE.  The STARLITE program was cancelled in early 1997 because of 
redundancies between the USAF and the NRO (STARLITE, 2006).  As a result of rising 
costs – the original projection of $3.5 billion had grown to between $6.5 and $10 billion – 
and ill-defined requirements, Discoverer II followed in the path of STARLITE and was 
cancelled by Congress in 2000 (Cáceres, 2006). 
In 2001, Space-Based Radar (SBR) was initiated as a new major defense 
acquisition program.  SBR was established as a joint program between the USAF and the 
NRO with the objective of providing a space borne radar capability for tracking moving 
targets beginning in 2008 (Space Based Radar History, 2006).  Throughout 2004, 2005, 
and 2006, the SBR program continually faced cost overruns and scrutiny.  In 2004, the 
GAO concluded the SBR would “likely be the most expensive and technically 
challenging space system ever built by DoD” (GAO, 2004).  The GAO also cautioned 
that the SBR program was repeating many of the same problems previously noted in DoD 
space programs.  These problems include “a failure to match requirements with resources 
when starting program development” and making commitments to technology 
prematurely (GAO, 2004).  In 2005, the Space Based Radar program was restructured 
and renamed Space Radar (SR).  As of 2005, the constellation of planned operational 
satellites was reduced to nine, with a first launch projected in “about 2015” at a cost of 
$34 billion for the total life-cycle costs (Space Based Radar History, 2006).   
As briefly discussed, the Space Radar program has a long history of 
struggling with technology and cost growth.  As with SBIRS-High, it is premature to 
make a final success or non-success decision on this program, and only the future will 
show whether or not SR has a place in history as a successful program fraught with 




The current state of USAF space systems acquisition and engineering culminated, 
in part from the efforts reviewed in this chapter.  As the Teal Group, Young Panel and 
DAPA Project have noted, the current state of national security space systems acquisition 
is not where we need to be and is certainly not where we want to be. 
Senator Wayne Allard, Republican from Colorado and member of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, has been very critical of the current state of national security 
space acquisitions.  At a late 2005 National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) 
symposium, Senator Allard voiced his strong feelings on this subject.  “As I see it, our 
nation’s dominance in space is being challenged not so much from outside this country 
but from within.  In many respects, we have become our own worst enemy.”  He 
continued to state that “Over the last decade, we have done everything possible to 
sabotage our space supremacy.  And, we have done this in every area of government at 
every possible turn.  Our warfighters, program managers, contractors, and yes, even 
Congress are responsible, and all are guilty of ignoring the warning signs.”  He clarified 
his position that it is not the space systems themselves that are creating these problems:  
“Once it gets to space, our satellites rarely disappoint.  Rather, our greatest challenge lies 
in the development and building of the satellite” (Allard, 2006). 
In his NDIA speech, Senator Allard also agreed with most of the conclusions 
from the Young Panel from 2003 and the fact that these problems still existed in 2005.  
However, Senator Allard focused on the acquisition process itself, instead of on the lack 
of talent.  He concluded that one of the problems centered on initiating programs 
prematurely without a thorough understanding of the technology and requirements.  
Many programs are driven to initiate a program prematurely because it is “easier for a 
program manager to secure money within the Department by including the technology 
development and system engineering within an acquisition program.”  Having so much 
technology in the core development of an acquisition program leads to “tremendous 
uncertainty” and forces the schedule of the space program to be “entirely dependent upon 
how fast the technology can be developed.”  Furthermore, Senator Allard placed a large 
amount of blame on the current competitive environment in which a competing 
contractor must put forth a very aggressive cost proposal.  This environment of overly 
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aggressive cost proposals combined with a lack of experienced program managers and 
systems engineers means the government will not uncover the “inadequacies of the 
original baselines” until very late in the program.  Finally, Senator Allard stated that there 
was a “profound absence of discipline when it comes to requirements definition.” 
To respond to the current state of national security space acquisition, Senator 
Allard put forth his own recommendations.  Senator Allard’s recommendations include 
slowing down the newest programs until better trained and more experienced personnel 
are in place to handle the management and systems engineering of the efforts, creating 
and justifying realistic cost estimates with a closer review of the required technologies, 
and limiting the amount of unproven technology and basic research and development that 
is incorporated into an acquisition program. 
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IV. RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND INTERVIEWS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The brief survey of successful programs and troubled programs conducted in this 
research effort reveals some interesting facts.  Even the “successful programs” of 
Discoverer/CORONA and the widely-touted GPS were fraught with acquisition and 
engineering failures.  History has deemed them successful because of the results achieved 
– in spite of the substantial difficulties in fielding these critical war-fighting capabilities.  
Perhaps, the same historical success is destined to be true of SBIRS-High and Space 
Radar.   
Furthermore, it is also history that determines success or failure of the various 
panels and commissions that have convened over the course of the last several decades.  
Therefore, it is important to view these efforts in relation to the long-term impacts.  Table 
2 attempts to correlate a snapshot of the most significant recommendations from these 
panels and commissions as they pertain to the areas of technology, personnel, process, 
procedures, and organization. 
 
Table 2. Recommendation Matrix 
As described above, each panel, report, or study entailed many specific 
recommendations.  As seen in Table 2, many of these recommendations actually 
contradict each other.  In fact, the only consistent themes through all of these reports are 
an emphasis on providing people with the right training and skills and a need to simplify 
and stabilize the process.  Even though the panel and commission recommended an effort 
to stabilize the acquisition process, they all put forth numerous specific recommendations 
for changing the process.  These contradictions and their lasting impacts on the USAF’s 
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space systems acquisition and engineering will be analyzed in detail in the remainder of 
this chapter. 
B. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
1. Analysis of Differences between Aircraft and Space Systems 
Engineering 
As the Packard Commission accurately depicted in 1986 and the DAPA Project’s 
Executive Summary stated in 2005, the problems of acquisition are to be found all across 
the Department of Defense.  These problems of acquisition are certainly not specific to 
USAF space systems. 
The space environment is not necessarily “harsher,” but it is most certainly 
different.  What makes space systems acquisition different is the need to get it done right 
the first time.  As Bissell stated during the days of the CORONA project, once you 
launch a satellite, you cannot just call it back and evaluate the failure so that you can try 
again next week (Richelson, 2002).  The need to get it done right the first time requires 
an extra level of program stability and an extra level of expertise and caution.   
However, space system acquisition and engineering is not fundamentally different 
from traditional Earth-bound systems acquisition.  Yet, in many cases, it does cost more.  
The need for exactness and quality drive the cost of satellite systems and is one of the 
primary reasons why space satellite systems face such scrutiny in the face of cost 
overruns.  An overrun of 50% on a satellite system that started out with a cost of $500M 
is much more difficult for Congress to accept than a 100% or even a 200% cost growth 
on a $10M ground transporter.  It is ironic that one of the very reasons for keeping space 
program funding stable (to be able to plan and prepare for an extra level of expertise and 
caution) is one of the drivers for Congressional oversight and Congressional angst over 
keeping the funding stable. 
2. Research Question Analysis 
a. Total System Performance Responsibility 
As the 2001 Space Commission, 2003 Young Panel, and 2005 DAPA 
Project all attest, the idea of TSPR that came out of the 1990’s acquisition reform 
initiatives has largely been discredited.  Many failures since the 1990’s have been 
attributed to lack of government participation and oversight during the early stages of the 
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program.  Another aspect of the TSPR era that is not so clearly recognized is a lasting 
impact on USAF personnel experience.  Many individuals in USAF space systems 
acquisition, through no fault of their own, were “raised” in the acquisition career field 
under the TSPR era.  When this legacy is combined with a lack of systematic and detailed 
training for personnel in the acquisition and engineering career fields, the DoD is left 
with an entire generation of acquirers that lack, again through no fault of their own, the 
requisite expertise to properly do their job. 
The recent re-emphasis on systems engineering expertise and training in 
the years since 2001 (i.e., the Young Panel, the SMC Primer, and the NSSAP 03-01) is an 
indicator that this TSPR legacy has left a recognized lack of systems engineering 
expertise, albeit with no quick-fix solution. 
b. Drawdown of Systems Engineering Expertise 
Another side-effect of TSPR and the acquisition reform era of the 1990’s 
is the inadvertent drawdown of systems engineering expertise on the part of contractors 
and the DoD and USAF.  On the government side of systems acquisition, TSPR called 
for less technical oversight of the contractors by the government.  Concurrently with 
TSPR (perhaps even a reason for TSPR and acquisition reform in general) was the 
tightening defense budget in the 1990’s.  Unfortunately, as the budget got tighter, the 
contractors had less funding to execute a program.  As the government was paying less 
attention to the systems engineering, the contractors, now without government resistance 
or scrutiny, curtailed at will their systems engineering effort by cutting their systems 
engineering personnel.  The government’s lack of attention to systems engineering 
inadvertently thus led to a drawdown of systems engineering expertise on the contractor 
side at the very critical point at which the government was relying on their systems 
engineering experiese the most.  The drawdown of systems engineering expertise on the 
the government side is recognized as a problem from which the DoD acquisition and 
engineering force is still recovering.  This drawdown recognition is also reflected by the 
call for greater systems engineering discipline and training in the most recent 
Congressional panels and studies. 
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c. Career Progression/Personnel Continuity of Air Force 
Professionals 
The issue of USAF career progression and personnel continuity in systems 
engineering and acquisition is a key factor in determining the stability for DoD programs 
and is also closely linked with the training of these USAF personnel.  As discussed in 
Chapter III, many of the studies and reports reviewed in this research recommend various 
aspects of a remedy for personnel continuity.  These recommendations include mandatory 
four-year assignments for program managers to ensure increased accountability, creation 
and sustainment of a space cadre with the requisite knowledge to manage and develop 
systems, and the institution of civilian leadership to foster an environment of reduced 
personnel transition, among many others.  Many recommendations, however, assume that 
the personnel had the requisite knowledge and experience and that the root problem 
dealing with personnel stability was too frequent rotations.  This assumption may or may 
not be true.  The root problem of the issue of personnel stability may well be the 
foundational creation of an acquisition and engineering expertise.  Once (if) created, 
these experienced personnel would then be suited for longer duration positions in charge 
of the systems engineering management and acquisition of critical DoD systems. 
d. Use of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
The use of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers provides 
the potential for combating the loss of government systems engineering expertise and for 
increasing the level of continuity between changing government program management.  
Unfortunately, however, none of the studies investigated in this research emphasized this 
potential.  Greater emphasis on the use of FFRDC may be able to help alleviate the loss 
of government systems engineering expertise and increase the level of continuity within 
program management organizations.  
3. Other Discoveries Specific to Space Systems Engineering 
a. Technology Maturity 
Each of the studies and panels investigated in Chapter III discussed 
technology readiness in some way.  The Packard Commission recommended the use of 
newer technology and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) items to help reduce cost and 
increase performance.  Many of the acquisition reform initiatives in the 1990’s also 
recommended the use of technology and expanding the use of COTS to help reduce cost.  
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Another technology recommendation to come out of the acquisition reform initiatives is 
the idea of cutting a program early if it is failing.  The fact that many efforts of the 1990’s 
are still struggling today (SBIRS-High and SR, to name just two) leads one to believe this 
recommendation in particular has never been embraced.  The recent DAPA Project 
recommended only pursuing the “80% solution” to achieve a basic capability instead of 
seeking programs with cutting edge technology to achieve a full desired capability.  
Additionally, Senator Allard’s recommendations included decreasing the reliance on 
technology.  His recommendations suggested technology should be left to be developed 
in the DoD’s set of research laboratories or in using basic research and development 
funding rather than developing technology as part of a mainstream acquisition program.  
Senator Allard’s recommendation matches well with the 80% solution idea to use what is 
already available instead of waiting for technology to mature. 
As discussed in Chapter III, the level of technological maturity is a key 
indicator as to how well a program will be executed.  The Discoverer/CORONA program 
was full of new technology and performed many technological ‘first’ breakthroughs.  The 
first twelve failed launches remain a testament to the difficulty in dealing with these 
technological breakthroughs.  However, the acquisition of Discoverer/CORONA would 
likely be viewed much differently today.  In the 1950’s the Discoverer/CORONA 
program was viewed with the utmost importance and urgency.  A program in the 21st 
century that faces twelve consecutive launch failures would likely not survive long 
enough to see its place in history turn favorable.  This idea of willingness to accept 
failure when necessity mandates is another key finding of this thesis effort. 
b. Risk Acceptance 
Perhaps second only to funding stability as an indicator of program 
performance is the willingness to accept risk.  As discussed in the previous section 
regarding technology, the Discoverer/CORONA program from the 1950’s and 1960’s is 
viewed successful historically, but it was fraught with failures in its beginning.  Risk 
acceptance is most fairly viewed as it relates to program urgency.  The CORONA 
intelligence was of the utmost importance then, and the CIA and the Eisenhower 
administration were therefore willing to accept twelve consecutive failures and to still 
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attempt the thirteenth launch.  The funding was available and the urgent need was real, so 
the risk was deemed acceptable. 
In today’s environment of tight budgets, losing a booster can be 
devastating to a program and can lead to changes in program prioritization and possibly 
cancellation.  At the very least, a failed launch or the failure of a satellite on orbit would 
lead to months of re-evaluation and examination to ensure the next launch be a success.  
The level of risk acceptance today is not the same as during the era of 
Discoverer/CORONA. 
c. Funding Stability 
Funding stability is of the utmost importance for a program to be a success 
and is one of the few areas identified as an acquisition problem by the majority of major 
acquisition studies and reports.  Unfortunately, the current budgetary process is driven by 
a very complex and sometimes inefficient system of checks and balances.  Though these 
checks and balances are necessary to ensure no organization that is a part of the process 
can abuse its authority, these check and balances lead to an inflexible acquisition system 
that borders on being impossibly complex.  In an acquisition program, the program 
manager is responsible for the balancing of cost, schedule, and performance/capability 
(along with many other factors such as risk and political environments).  As will be 
discussed in Chapter IV, the acquisition system is pulled in all three directions of cost, 
schedule, and performance/capability by the different organizations that are involved.  
DoD wants the best performance/capability in the shortest amount of time.  Congress 
wants the lowest cost possible so as to be able to fund as many programs as possible.  
The developing contractor wants to minimize cost and hence to maximize profit and 
maximize performance as well to remain competitive.  Because all three (cost, schedule, 
and performance/capability) cannot be optimized simultaneously, the yearly budgetary 
process attempts to fix the yearly cost to be able to solve the conflicting demands of each 
organization.  Unfortunately, fixing the yearly cost without regard for the future cost is 
very dangerous and leads to programs being extended year by year.  This solution also 
leads to an antagonistic relationship between the DoD, Congress, and the contractors, 
which creates a spiral of mistrust over the accuracy and accountability of program 
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projections and program status.  Therefore, each year, the funding is in question, and the 
overall program schedule suffers for it. 
d. Personnel Training 
Personnel training and expertise is the only area in which all of the 
referenced studies and Congressional panels consistently agreed.  The USAF personnel 
involved in DoD acquisition must be well trained in order to better produce weapons and 
equipment for the DoD.  The fact that, in early 2006, Senator Allard was still 
recommending major space programs be delayed in order to wait to get the right people 
in place to do the job is a testament to the failure of these previous recommendations to 
have a positive impact on personnel training and expertise.  This area of training and 
expertise holds the greatest potential to make recognizable and lasting contributions to 
the correction of USAF space systems engineering and acquisition.  
The USAF trains a pilot for at least two years and spends hundreds of 
thousands of dollars (if not millions over the course of a pilot’s career) to make sure that 
each individual pilot knows how to fly his/her specific aircraft.  Pilots are drilled with 
EP’s (emergency procedures) to know what to do in the event of any conceivable failure 
and spend a large proportion of their active duty careers training, upgrading, learning, and 
re-training.  In contrast, at the start of a new career, acquisition professionals get a four-
week online course that teaches the fundamentals of acquisition and the timeline of the 
DoD 5000 series (at a cost of a few hundred dollars.)  The curriculum is centered on how 
to run a program that is already running smoothly, and there is no discussion of how to 
correct a troubled program (analogous to a pilot’s EP’s), or even to recognize a troubled 
program.  The extent of instruction on recognizing a troubled program is whether or not it 
looks like the Powerpoint slide depicting an “on-track” program! 
e. Acquisition Process – A System of Checks and Balances 
The current Department of Defense acquisition process is highly 
analogous to the Federal Government’s system of checks and balances.  The Federal 
Government was established with an intentional system of checks and balances between 
the branches of government.  The Congress can make laws, but the laws are interpreted 
by the Judicial arm of the government and the laws are enforced by the Executive office.  
The Executive branch establishes a budget, but it cannot execute the budget without both 
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an appropriation and an authorization from Congress.  This system of government with 
each branch having only certain powers is inherently complex and in many ways 
inefficient.  It is also inefficient, helping to ensure no one person or branch of the 
government would have too much power and influence over the country.  So too is the 
current Department of Defense acquisition process. 
A high-level view of the current acquisition process includes the 
Department of Defense (answering to the Executive office) to establish requirements, the 
Congress to appropriate and authorize funding, and the industrial complex of defense 
contractors to execute funding to meet requirements.  In this acquisition process, a 
contractor must compete for a program (thereby wanting to show its proposed cost and 
schedule in the best possible light.)  The DoD establishes requirements knowing that it 
will take several years to receive a capability (thereby wanting to show a future growth in 
capability).  Finally, the Congress is responsible for establishing appropriation and 
authorization bills (while trying to fund as many programs as possible for the maximum 
benefit of the American people and the Congressmen/women’s own constituents.)  A 
process set up with such checks and balances is bound to be complex, inflexible, and 
many times inefficient.  Just as the Federal Government’s system of checks and balances 
is not necessarily bad, as it holds each branch responsible for its actions, the DoD 
acquisition process being set up in a similar fashion is likewise not necessarily bad.  
Though it may be inefficient, this acquisition process has produced high quality military 
systems in the past.  The fact that the DoD acquisition process is a system of checks and 
balances holds each organization accountable for its area of responsibility. 
C. EXPERT INTERVIEW 
1. Donald Hard, Major General, USAF (Retired) 
Donald Hard retired from the United States Air Force in August 1993 as a major 
general.  During his distinguished Air Force career MajGen Hard served in a number of 
space systems acquisition positions that would qualify him as experienced in this field.  
Since his retirement in 1993, MajGen Hard has served as an independent consultant to 
various Government organization and aerospace industry companies.  He is currently 
supporting the Air Force Space Command and Space and Missile Systems Center on a 
variety of space systems engineering efforts.  He is also actively supporting numerous 
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Independent Review Team efforts.  Furthermore, he was a member of the Young Panel, 
convened by USecAF Peter B. Teets in 2003 to review National Security Space programs 
and processes and is a member of the currently on-going [as of the time this document 
was released for publication] Independent Senior Advisory Group Space Assessment 
Team being led by General (USAF, Retired) Larry D. Welch.  Additionally, MajGen 
Hard is currently leading an Independent Review Team in support of the Lockheed 
Martin Atlas V Program and a collaborative FFRDC review of Space Situational 
Awareness for the USAF.  Finally, he is the principal participant in many on-going 
reviews of systems engineering in the areas of launch operations and mission assurance 
for the USAF, the NRO, and NASA. 
As noted above, MajGen Hard’s decades of active duty experience, consulting 
experience, and follow-on participation in some of the very panels researched within this 
thesis qualify him in the fields of space systems acquisition and space systems 
engineering to provide additional insights on this research topic.  The remainder of 
Section C. describes MajGen Hard’s thoughts during a personal interview held on 18 Aug 
2006. 
MajGen Hard emphasized that systems engineering, though it cannot be divorced 
from acquisition, is but a part of the systems acquisition process.  Therefore, good 
systems engineers and good systems engineering practices cannot solve today’s space 
systems acquisition issues alone.  Additionally, MajGen Hard provided his thoughts on 
the role of a systems engineer in today’s space systems acquisition arena.  The 
acquisition of new space systems has many stakeholders which introduces much 
instability.  In support of systems acquisition, the systems engineer is in the most critical 
position of risk identification and risk management in support of the program manager.  
MajGen Hard called budget instability a “fact-of-life” and said the systems engineer must 
learn to live in this environment and be able to provide the program manager with 
recommendations for balancing performance/capability and the associated risk within 
cost and/or schedule constraints.  This ability for a systems engineer is especially 
important in a program that has tight cost, schedule, and performance/capability 
constraints.  In this situation, a program manager may need to accept risk in order to 
proceed with a program under such tight constraints, and the systems engineer will find 
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himself or herself in the vital position of determining which risks are acceptable and 
which ones are not and making a recommendation to the program manager.   
The remainder of Section C, Chapter IV, contains thoughts from MajGen Hard 
pertaining to the author’s research findings in Section B of Chapter IV.  The author 
provided his thoughts and research findings to MajGen Hard.  The following Subsections 
a. through j. describe MajGen Hard’s supporting thoughts in each of the areas of research 
findings.  
a. Analysis of Differences between Aircraft and Space Systems 
Engineering 
Though it is true that the detailed engineering of a space system is based 
on the same principles as an aircraft system (e.g., thermal analysis or stress analysis, etc.), 
the operational environment of a satellite system dictates this detailed engineering be 
done, in MajGen Hard’s words, “absolutely perfectly” prior to launch.  The operational 
environment also requires the space vehicle to be able to survive the launch environment 
and then to operate for the duration of its mission life autonomously (i.e., without 
refueling, without hands-on anomaly correction, etc).   
Another peculiarity of space systems is the low numbers that are typically 
purchased.  The current USAF budget and acquisition processes are set up to support 
large quantity buys.  Even if one compares a low-quantity buy aircraft (F/A-22) and a 
high-quantity-buy satellite system (GPS), the difference in production units is a full order 
of magnitude.  As MajGen Hard stated this issue, “Equally important, in a space system 
acquisition, changes in the current year development costs cannot be easily mitigated by 
simply changing the number of units to be produced.”  More specifically, this means any 
cost impacts on a satellite acquisition system will need to be absorbed by a smaller 
production run and the associated per-unit cost will be inflated by a much higher 
percentage.   
Finally, the fact that a satellite system must be launched before use is 
another critical difference.  Launching satellites into space is not routine; in fact, it is 
often the harshest environment the satellite will face.  In addition to a satellite needing to 
meet derived requirements for survivability during launch, the launch itself is the most 
dangerous prospect in the satellite’s life.  Boosters can fail or insert a satellite into the 
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incorrect orbit.  Because launch is still an inherently dangerous prospect for a satellite to 
survive, there is a natural tendency for engineers and program managers to “get-the-most-
bang-for-the-buck” and put as many payloads and as much capability onto a space 
platform as possible.  Combining different payloads on a single satellite has many 
disadvantages.  As MajGen Hard stated, this leads to “complex arrangements all through 
a program’s life cycle – from requirements generation through prioritization during 
operations.”  This natural tendency is contrary to the way early aircraft systems were 
produced and is contrary to long-term desires to make space use routine and operationally 
responsive.  Coupled with the low-quantity buys of space systems, this tendency also 
further exacerbates the cost, schedule and performance/capability problems that are 
seemingly inherent in space systems development. 
b. Total System Performance Responsibility 
Based on his previous consulting efforts, MajGen Hard agreed there is a 
lasting impact of the TSPR reform initiatives on today’s USAF systems engineering 
expertise.  Describing first-hand experience, he described an era of declining defense 
budgets leading to personnel cuts and a drawdown in active duty and government civilian 
systems engineering expertise in the early 1990’s.  At the time, TSPR was an imposed 
shift in systems acquisition.  The FFRDC were capped and could not provide the required 
experts to fill the void.  Furthermore, second source developers and Systems Engineering 
and Technical Assistance (SETA) contractors could not be brought on board to support 
due to unqualified personnel and the declining budgets.  In large part, this lack of 
government systems engineers led to the TSPR idea of requiring the prime developing 
contractors to conduct the necessary systems engineering.  Over time, the government 
systems engineers who should have been managing risk in light of the declining budgets 
became reporters.  In addition to creating a passive cadre of government systems 
engineers, the TSPR initiatives contributed to a “we vs. they” mentality between the 
government and the contractor communities.  This mentality will be discussed later under 
Subsection h in Section C.  
c. Drawdown of Systems Engineering Expertise 
As described by MajGen Hard, during the interview, the TSPR initiative 
combined with tighter budgets, inevitably led to “out-of-control advocacy,” incredibly 
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low cost estimates and the unfortunate consequence of a parallel drawdown of systems 
engineering expertise on the contractor side of the “we vs. they” paradigm.  In a program 
with a dwindling budget, due to the lack of specific government oversight, an easy place 
for a contractor to cut costs is in management and systems engineering.  After all, it is 
nearly impossible to cut costs once a program has “bent metal.”  At this point, late in a 
program, the manufacturing and build costs have already been determined as a result of 
decisions made much earlier in the program.  However, it is still relatively easy 
(“although usually disastrous”) to cut the labor hours of the management staff and the 
systems engineering staff.  This drawdown in contractor systems engineers, combined 
with a now passive government systems engineering management approach, deferred the 
looming risk until later and further exacerbated the acquisition process. 
d. Career Progression/Personnel Continuity of Air Force 
Professionals 
MajGen Hard agreed there are issues related to continuity of USAF 
personnel.  He viewed these issues as being related to training issues and his thoughts 
will be discussed and included later in Subsection i in Section C. 
e. Use of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
As noted above in his discussion of TSPR, MajGen Hard explained the 
use of FFRDC as his preferred approach to filling the void in government expertise.  
Unfortunately, the use of this critical resource is capped by Congress, and there simply 
isn’t enough to meet the need. 
f. Technology Maturity 
In the area of technological maturity, MajGen Hard echoed and 
wholeheartedly agreed with the 80% solution idea discussed earlier in Section B.  He also 
agreed with an incremental block-building approach to developing and producing space 
satellite systems.  Additionally, as noted above, MajGen Hard described the natural 
tendency to fill a satellite with as much capability as possible.  This natural tendency 
pushes the state-of-the-art of technology and significantly increases risk.  Therefore, in 
MajGen Hard’s words, the development of high technology space systems is “naturally 
expensive” and “naturally prone to risk.”  Also, according to MajGen Hard, “today’s 
systems are much more complex than when the text books were written” making the 
acquisition of these systems that much more difficult.   
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Another factor leading to a satellite system’s complexity is the difference 
between developing what MajGen Hard called a “first-of” capability as opposed to a 
replacement system.  As the USAF began developing satellite systems, such as 
CORONA, DSP, and DSCS, each minor success was hard-fought and the entire program 
was done by virtue of investments for general capabilities (photographic reconnaissance, 
early warning, and strategic communications respectively).  These programs were all 
“first-of” capabilities.  Today, while attempting to replace capabilities that have become 
critical to our national security, the DoD wants an improved capability that still operates 
with the legacy system it is replacing and that is specified “to the third decimal point” 
right off the launch pad and will accept little else.  In this situation, motivation to improve 
is “the enemy of good-enough.”  This motivation to improve further drives technology 
development which, in a program of fixed cost and fixed schedule, creates an extremely 
risky program. 
g. Risk Acceptance 
MajGen Hard viewed the systems engineer’s role as critical to study the 
risks and study the program to know which risks are acceptable.  The systems engineer’s 
role is central to the trade of cost and/or schedule and/or performance/capability with 
risk.  This role also must assist the program manager make trades between risk and 
urgency of a program.  If the cost and schedule profiles are determined to be fixed, 
MajGen Hard asserted risk acceptance is sometimes the only way to balance the cost, 
schedule, and performance/capability pressures of an acquisition program.  Therefore, the 
systems engineer’s job in risk identification and risk assessment is of the utmost 
importance. 
h. Funding Stability 
“Learn to live with budget instability.”  According to MajGen Hard, 
budget, and therefore program, instability has become a fact of acquisition and the 
program manager and systems engineers must learn to live with this instability.  In part, 
this is because one of the real problems of acquisition in general is the need to form 
program advocacy in order to support the Congressional budgeting process.  There are so 
many stakeholders involved in the process that budget stability is an impossibility 
because of the stakeholders’ competing interests.  Furthermore, each of the organizations 
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involved can stop an effort or impact an effort, but it takes the willing and able 
cooperation of all organizations simultaneously to form progress.  For space satellite 
programs, this instability is compounded by a mismatch within the USAF budgeting 
process between mainstream high-production quantity aircraft programs and low-
production quantity satellites systems.  The lead systems engineer must be able and 
willing to analyze trades of schedule and performance/capability with acceptable risks to 
make good recommendations in order to match the ups and downs of budget instability.   
Therefore, the systems engineer’s job becomes again, one of risk identification, risk 
assessment, and risk mitigation.  Risk management is his or her primary role in USAF 
space systems engineering. 
Additionally, budget instability drives, and is driven by, the lasting “we 
vs. they” relationship between developing contractors and the government program 
offices that resulted from the implementation of TSPR and underfunded contracts.  
Because, as MajGen Hard stated, the “contractor is working on a ‘cut-my-losses’ basis 
[due to the severe cost competition environment], the government program office no 
longer trusts the contractor cost estimates.”  Neither does the Congress trust the 
government program office cost estimates.  There is mistrust among all stakeholders in 
the budget process and, almost inevitably, a program will not be funded for success, or 
even the most probable cost, but rather, will be funded based on an unrealistic or 
unreasonable cost estimate that could be justified as the bare minimum acceptable. 
Finally, MajGen Hard warned against too much stability in the acquisition 
process that could lead to a stagnant acquisition process.  Though he agreed change for 
the sake of change is unnecessary and can be dangerous, he cautioned that complete 
process stability can be a sign that “something is dying.”  Within all processes, there 
should be room for continuous improvement and one job of a systems engineer is to help 
the program manager analyze risks and accommodate necessary change, e.g., Continuous 
Process Improvement, in the most cost effective way possible. 
i. Personnel Training 
Although MajGen Hard agreed that personnel training is necessary and 
good for a systems engineer, he disagreed with the ability or even recommendation to 
prescribe a single process for training all acquisition and engineering officers that will 
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enter the Space Cadre.  He recalled his own on the job training and early experiences in 
developing space programs.  Primarily, his training was a result of listening and learning 
as a young officer.  His supervisors took it upon themselves to work with him on a daily 
basis and tell him what to do, show him how to do it, and within that, how to interact, in a 
team environment, with the developing contractors.  MajGen Hard noted this type of 
training and education is unlikely to be possible today.  Partially as a result of TSPR and 
the we/they-relationship between contractors and government (due to the “bet-your-
company cost-plus competitions), and primarily a result of manning shortfalls, most 
supervisors today simply do not have the time to take the same care and effort in training 
young officers as MajGen Hard related from his early experiences.  In his first 
experience, he was a lone lieutenant in a large office full of experienced and qualified 
majors and lieutenant colonels who all helped “raise him” in acquisitions.   
Based on his previous consulting efforts, MajGen Hard stated a typical 
space program office today is minimally manned at 65% of the allowed personnel due to 
manning shortfalls.  Additionally, in a typical space program office today, the relative 
ratio of junior to senior officers is reversed from MajGen Hard’s days when there were 
far fewer junior officers.  Because the new accessions are struggling to learn their role as 
an engineer or acquisition officer, the small number of well qualified senior individuals 
are forced to do much more of the burden of work leaving less and less time for 
instructing or mentoring the next generation of space systems engineers.  
Instead of a concentrated, standard training effort, MajGen Hard 
recommended an approach of pulling space systems engineers from the full range of 
related activities: laboratories, operational assignments, other acquisitions, and brand-
new accessions.  The important thing he felt is a trait that cannot be trained no matter 
what formal or long-term training is implemented:  Passion.  Based on MajGen Hard’s 
independent review efforts, he stated the success of many satellite programs in the past 
has been, in large part, a result of passionate people working hard for things they believe 
in.  Relating to the passion of individual program managers and systems engineers 
working in a complex acquisition process, MajGen Hard said “sometimes, we [the 
USAF] have been successful in spite of the process.”  Unfortunately, in an office where 
lieutenants are struggling to learn their job and their supervisors have little time to assist 
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them, the environment is not conducive to fostering this type of personal passion for the 
mission or the job. 
j. Acquisition Process – A System of Checks and Balances 
MajGen Hard agreed with the fundamental idea that the system acquisition 
process is inherently difficult.  He used the terminology of the DAPA Project that the 
Big-A (Acquisition Process) is a precarious balance of the budget, requirements, and 
acquisition processes.  The Little-A is the “how-to” acquisition process that describes the 
day-to-day management activities of a program office.  As the DAPA Project stated, 
MajGen Hard agreed that the Big-A is a highly complex and interdependent process and 
systems engineering is just one piece of the Little-A.  Yet, good systems engineers, with a 
passion for what they do and a supportive environment, have the ability to properly 
assess and help manage the risks that are driven by the Big-A acquisition process. 
Additionally, MajGen Hard reiterated one possible way of attempting to 
address this complexity inherent in the acquisition process would be in splitting the space 
budget from the USAF budget as a stand-along Major Force Program (MFP).  This 
recommendation was in the Space Commission report in 2001 and would help alleviate 
the issues of space programs competing with other USAF programs for funding and 
advocacy. 
D. SUMMARY 
Many of the research findings discussed above are not new.  In fact, several of 
them have been repeatedly put forth by many of the Congressional panels and 
commissions that have reviewed the status and well-being of space systems acquisition 
specifically as well as defense systems acquisition in general.  As shown in this Chapter, 
this acquisition process is an inherently difficult process – not just because it is a difficult 
endeavor to balance the competing forces of cost, schedule, and performance/capability 
within constrained resources of people, funding, time, etc., but also because it is difficult 
to operate in, through, and from the space environment.  Partially as a result of these 
efforts, including the Packard Commission, Acquisition Reform Initiatives, the Space 
Commission, and the Young Panel, the current status of USAF space systems acquisition 
is both as good and as bad as described in this thesis.  However, if the USAF is to 
overcome the recent spate of admonishment from Congress and others that it has faced, 
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much work remains.  Unfortunately, as described previously in Chapter IV, many of the 
very same panels and commissions that have admonished the process have also provided 
conflicting recommendations for resolving the issues associated with defense systems 
acquisition.  According to the analysis in Chapter III, one area that holds the most 
significant promise for being able to realize focused, incremental improvements is 
systems engineering – specifically the level of expertise for USAF systems engineering 
personnel.  The recommendations provided by the author in Chapter V are intended to 
echo some previous and still-valid recommendations from the various commissions 
reviewed and also are intended to provide a focus on the role and responsibility of the 
USAF systems engineer to assist the program manager balance the difficult task of 
developing and delivering space systems for the Department of Defense.  These 
recommendations are based upon the in-depth literature review and the discussion with 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW OF SPACE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND ACQUISITION 
The following 20-year synopsis of DoD acquisition and space systems 
engineering shows how significant the problems pertaining to space systems acquisition 
are: 
In 1986, the Packard Commission said “… when a program finally 
receives budget approval, it embodies not only overstated requirements, 
but also underestimated costs.” 
In 2001, the Space Commission stated “The U.S. will not remain 
the world’s leading space-faring nation by relying on yesterday’s 
technology to meet today’s requirements at tomorrow’s prices.” 
In 2003, the Young Panel concluded “Significant cost growth and 
schedule delays in many critical space system programs have caused 
senior DoD and Intelligence Community leadership to question our 
nation’s ability to acquire and sustain national security space systems.” 
In 2005, in response to the question “Whether or not cost overruns 
are inherent in U.S. military satellites under development,” the Teal Group 
responded, “we cannot say for sure.  We can say that these overruns seem 
to be endemic.” 
Also in 2005, the DAPA Project stated “Congress and Department 
of Defense senior leadership have lost confidence in the Acquisition 
System’s ability to determine what needs to be procured or to predict with 
any degree of accuracy what things will cost, when they will be delivered, 
or how they will perform.” 
In 2006, Senator Allard, member of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, said “Over the last decade, we have done everything possible 
to sabotage our space supremacy.  And, we have done this in every area of 
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government at every possible turn.  …[O]ur greatest challenge lies in the 
development and building of the satellite.” 
The problems today are no less severe than 20 years ago.  If anything, the 
problems today are more significant because many of the space systems developed and 
deployed in past decades during an era of larger budgets and greater forgiveness of risk 
are now aging and in need of replenishment and/or replacement.  The fact that the DoD 
space systems engineering and acquisition processes have been as successful as they have 
is a strong indicator of the determination, expertise, and passion of the personnel 
involved.  This fact is also, ironically, a reason for high expectations today, in an era of 
tighter budgets and less tolerance of high risk – high failure programs.  As space becomes 
“routine” and commercial launch providers establish a successful track record of access 
to space, this expectation will become higher and higher of military space professionals.  
These space professionals – primarily in the USAF – must be properly trained and 
equipped to handle the job that will be expected of them. 
B. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although each finding above is not necessarily conducive to a specific, actionable 
recommendation directly pertaining to space systems engineering expertise, the following 
ideas are recommended for consideration based on the research conducted. 
1. Analysis of Differences between Aircraft and Space Systems 
Engineering 
As discussed in Sections B. 1 and C. 1. i of Chapter IV, space systems – 
specifically the satellite components of space systems – must be absolutely perfect prior 
to launch.  Additionally, the launch environment itself is still a dangerous and non-
routine activity that must be overcome for a satellite system to be successful.  Therefore, 
there is a natural tendency for program managers and systems engineers to want to 
include as many payloads and as much capability in a satellite system as possible prior to 
launch.  Finally, because space systems are typically more expensive than traditional 
earth-bound systems due to the reasons outlined in Sections B. 1 and C. 1. i of Chapter 
IV, program advocacy, in MajGen Hard’s words, is “out of control.”  Based on this 
analysis, the following recommendation is put forth: 
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• Embrace and develop routine access to space with an enhanced launch 
infrastructure. 
This recommendation would allow space systems to be more feasibly launched in 
incremental fashion because the lower resulting cost associated with launch would result 
in less desire to get the “bang-for-the-buck” by striving for 100% capability and multiple 
payloads.  Although costly in the near-term, following this recommendation could also, 
over time, establish a more cost-effective launch infrastructure to support future space 
programs. 
2. Total System Performance Responsibility 
Since the 1990’s implementation of TSPR as an acquisition reform policy, nearly 
every other major review of DoD systems acquisition has concluded that TSPR has 
created more problems than it solved (including the Young Panel, specifically responsible 
for a review of space systems engineering and acquisition).  As such and as shown in 
Sections B. 2. a and C. 1. b of Chapter IV, many USAF systems engineers today do not 
know their role in the acquisition process.  This role is one of risk management.  The 
following recommendation will help define and determine the future role of USAF 
systems engineers in the systems acquisition process. 
• Define the role of the government systems engineer as one of a risk 
manager – utilize systems engineers to identify, assess, and mitigate 
program cost, schedule, and performance/capability risks. 
The government systems engineer’s fundamental role is to identify, assess, and 
mitigate risk in support of the program manager.  Rather than being a reporter, properly 
trained government systems engineers may effectively be able to help erase the remaining 
legacy of TSPR and help maintain stability in the acquisition cycle by conducting quality 
risk management. 
3. Drawdown of Systems Engineering Expertise 
As shown in Sections B. 2. a/b and C. 1. b/c of Chapter IV, the drawdown of 
systems engineering expertise on the part of the contractors and DoD/USAF is closely 
related to the TSPR reform initiatives of the 1990’s.  Therefore, the same 
recommendation applies: 
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• Define the role of the government systems engineer as one of a risk 
manager – utilize systems engineers to identify, assess, and mitigate 
program cost, schedule, and performance/capability risks. 
In addition to being closely linked with TSPR, the recommendations from the 
following Sections 4 and 5 may also help alleviate the residual drawdown of systems 
engineering expertise. 
4. Career Progression/Personnel Continuity of Air Force Professionals 
As discussed in sections B. 2. c and C. 1. d of Chapter IV, career progression and 
personnel continuity of USAF professionals create many issues for space systems 
engineering.  As personnel move from one job to another, it is necessary to have a 
method of tracking the top-performers who show the greatest ability to conduct systems 
engineering and systems acquisition. 
• Implement a method of tracking the top space acquisition and space 
engineering professionals. 
In addition to the Air Force Space Command’s recent efforts at creating a 
professional Space Cadre, the method recommended by then-Major Christopher Forseth 
in  “The Pursuit of Acquisition Intrapreneurs” of tracking top performing acquisition 
professionals could help reverse the lasting TSPR impact of creating a passive 
government cadre of systems engineers. 
5. Use of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
As discussed in Sections B. 2. a/b and C 1. b/c, there are not enough government 
and contractor systems engineering personnel to properly conduct systems engineering 
activities in support of space systems acquisition.  Additionally, Sections B. 2. d and C. 1. 
e of Chapter IV discussed a shortage of FFRDC personnel to meet the need for systems 
engineering expertise.  Therefore, the number of FFRDC should be reviewed. 
• Establish and conduct a review of numerical sufficiency of FFRDC to 
meet the needs of USAF space systems acquisition. 
As noted by MajGen Hard, one of the key drivers for the institution of TSPR 
reform policies was a lack of sufficient FFRDC personnel to fill the void of government 
systems engineering expertise.  In part, this was and remains dependent on 
77 
Congressionally mandated personnel restrictions.  In an effort to help the government 
meet the requirement for greater systems engineering expertise while its own personnel 
become better equipped to properly conduct systems engineering activities, the current 
caps on numbers of FFRDC personnel should be reviewed for sufficiency in light of the 
number and complexity of on-going and near-term space programs.   
6. Technology Maturity 
Technology maturity has repeatedly been an issue for space systems engineering.  
This was discussed in the findings of the Young Panel, the DAPA Project, the Teal 
Group and most recently by Senator Allard.  The following recommendations are re-
iterated from these previous studies. 
• Institute detailed technology review as part of all Milestone Decisions. 
• Embrace 80% solution methodology recommended by numerous panels. 
Neither of these recommendations is new or original.  However, it is hoped that 
these recommendations will find better traction for acceptance in the future if a more 
cost-effective launch infrastructure is put in place as recommended in Section B. 1 of this 
chapter. 
7. Risk Acceptance 
Some risk is unavoidable.  If a program is urgent and has acceptable risks, the 
program should be funded appropriately.  As discussed above in Sections B. 3. b and C. 
1. g of Chapter IV, some programs contain risk associated with program urgency and 
some programs contain risk associated with trades of cost and/or schedule and/or 
performance/capability.  The following recommendation is provided, assuming a systems 
engineer has identified and assessed the risk as recommended in Sections 2 and 3 of this 
chapter. 
• Fund programs appropriately and recognize the risk associated with the 
funding level. 
This recommendation assumes a systems engineer is provided the skills and 
authority to complete his/her job as the risk manager of a program.  This recommendation 
specifically does not recommend planning for a high-technology breakthrough as the 
solution; rather it depends on the systems engineer to identify and assess the risk, create a 
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mitigation strategy, and then make recommendations to the program manager who can 
request funding as required.  If the funding requested is not available, the systems 
engineer is responsible for either recommending cuts to performance/capability to 
maintain a proper cost, schedule, and performance/capability balance or recommending 
what new risk to accept under what new risk mitigation strategy. 
8. Funding Stability 
As recommended by the Space Commission Report in 2001, the establishment of 
a Space Major Force Program would help bring about greater funding stability for space 
programs.  The establishment of a Space MFP would effectively further the Space 
Commission recommendation for laying the foundation of an eventual Space Corps or 
Space Force.  Based on the ideas in Sections B. 3. c and C. 1. i of Chapter IV, and the 
fact that the Space Commission Report’s recommendation has not yet been adopted, the 
following recommendation is made:   
• Establish a Space Major Force Program as originally recommended in the 
2001 Space Commission Report. 
This recommendation is not new or original.  However, as noted in “A Separate 
Space Force: An 80-Year-Old Argument,” by Chaplain Colonel Michael C. Whittington 
in 2000, funding is one of the key reasons the USAF fought for independence from the 
United States Army.  It is also one of the key reasons the USAF ought to consider and 
embrace an independent Space Corps to prevent funding conflicts between the USAF’s 
top priority programs (e.g., F/A-22) and the United States’ national security need for 
space systems.  It is hoped that this recommendation will find better traction for 
acceptance in the future in light of tighter budgets and the growing complexity and cost 
of both space satellite systems and traditional aircraft systems.   
9. Personnel Training 
The lack of detailed training for systems engineering personnel in the USAF is 
closely linked with the career progression/personnel continuity issues discussed 
previously under Section B. 4 of this chapter.  The same recommendation applies. 
• Implement a method of tracking the top space acquisition and space 
engineering professionals. 
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In addition to this repeated recommendation, two other recommendations also 
apply based on the research included in Sections B. 3. d and C. 1. i  of Chapter IV. 
• Implement and conduct basic space systems engineering training in 
support of space systems acquisition. 
Based on the findings in Section B. 3. d of Chapter IV, there would certainly be 
some value added in conducting some basic training for all space systems acquisition 
personnel – specifically the systems engineering personnel.  Although MajGen Hard 
offered caution before implementing a full structured and detailed training program, as 
this recommendation states, a basic space systems engineering training program should 
be analyzed in greater detail for implementation. 
• Reward mid-level supervisors for good performance by their subordinates. 
Provided these mid-level supervisors have been recognized and tracked according 
to the recommendation in Section B. 4, this recommendation would foster an 
environment for mentoring and learning the systems engineering trade by virtue of 
leading by example.  Mentoring need not be contrived and is best done by listening and 
learning naturally. 
10. Acquisition Process – A System of Checks and Balances 
Based on the analysis described in Sections B. 3. e. and C. 1. j of Chapter IV, the 
acquisition process itself is inherently difficult.  Pronounced by the Packard Commission 
and recently by Senator Allard, this fact regarding the acquisition process is readily 
apparent.  Rather than allowing the process by which space systems are developed to 
become the most significant burden, the following ideas are recommended for 
consideration: 
• Maintain stability of the “Little-A” (as defined by the DAPA Project) by 
not instituting sweeping, divergent change every time a program faces 
adversity, but do not stifle creativity and passion. 
This recommendation would allow a systems engineer the opportunity to properly 
conduct his/her most important job – risk management, including risk identification, 
assessment, and mitigation. 
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• Identify, assess, and mitigate risk to accommodate changes in the “Big-A” 
acquisition process. 
Fulfilling this recommendation constitutes a systems engineer’s real opportunity 
to help a flailing space systems acquisition process improve.  By identifying, assessing, 
and mitigating risks, a properly trained and equipped systems engineer could effectively 
assist the program manager lead a program to success in spite of an inefficient and flawed 
acquisition process. 
C. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
This has been a massive undertaking – much larger than this researcher 
anticipated at the start of this project – and many stones remain unturned.  Much work 
remains to be accomplished.  It is the hope of this author that the historical overview and 
analysis of previous studies accomplished in this thesis will provide a foundation, or at 
least a stepping stone, for future researchers to expand upon these recommendations and 
steadily make progressive improvements in DoD and USAF space systems engineering 
expertise. 
Between the time of the Young Panel and the DAPA Project, Air Force Space 
Command and the Space and Missile Systems Center have made great strides toward 
improving the Space Cadre recommended in the Space Commission.  These efforts were 
commended in the Young Panel, and for what it is worth, this author offers his 
commendation as well.  These efforts promise to bear significant fruit in expanding the 
expertise of USAF Space Professionals and USAF space acquisition experts.  However, 
as noted above, these individuals must be tracked and allowed to “grow-up” in their 
respective space career fields.  Training a junior engineer in one of the new space 
professional education courses does little good for the future of space systems 
engineering if her next job is in Air Force Materiel Command working on an F/A-22 
upgrade.  Further analysis is needed to delve into the tracking of space professionals and 
how to let them prosper as Space Cadre without impacting their competitiveness for 
promotion as compared to rated officers and traditional acquisition/engineer officers. 
Tracking space professionals is important, but more emphasis should also be 
placed on properly tracking acquisition professionals in general.  This tracking should 
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include engineers and scientists as well as acquisition officers.  The implementation of 
detailed, albeit time consuming, training has been recommended above for new engineers 
and acquisition officers.  As recommended by Lt Col Forseth in “The Pursuit of 
Acquisition Intrapreneurs,” (2001) a rewards structure including the long-term 
designation as an ‘expert’ should be further analyzed for possible implementation as soon 
as possible. 
In conjunction with the tracking of a Space Cadre, further research is required as 
to the potential benefits of establishing a separate space budget distinct from the USAF 
budget.  The Space Commission recommended the foundation be put in place for the 
eventual implementation of a Space Corps or Space Force.  Efforts to establish a single 
chain of command under Air Force Space Command have begun to prepare the USAF for 
such a change.  However, the USAF budget still contains competition between space 
programs (e.g., SBIRS-High) and mainstream USAF programs (e.g., F/A-22).  In 
addition to furthering the Space Commission’s recommendations, creating a Space Major 
Force Program would induce greater funding and program stability in space programs.  
This recommendation should be analyzed in greater detail for implementation as soon as 
possible. 
Finally, the issue of FFRDC utilization is another area that requires further study.  
The issues associated with a lack of government systems engineering expertise are not 
going to be resolved quickly by implementing any or even all of the recommendations 
put forth in this thesis or any other study to date.  The FFRDC’s role in space systems 
engineering can hold promise to help fill this void if utilized effectively.  Unfortunately, 
limited by Congressional caps, the current level of support the FFRDCs are able to 
provide is less than is required.  This limitation should be investigated and a 
determination made whether or not the level of available FFRDC support can be 
increased quickly enough to support the government in the near term. 
D. SUMMARY 
The government systems engineer’s fundamental role is best defined as a risk 
manager in support of the program manager.  In addition to the basic systems engineering 
skills discussed in Chapter II, the additional ability to identify, assess, and mitigate risk 
comprises a good systems engineer’s real opportunity to help a flailing space system 
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improve or help a new space system avoid unnecessary cost, schedule, or 
performance/capability impacts.  A properly trained and equipped systems engineer can 
effectively assist the program manager lead a program to success in spite of an inefficient 
and flawed acquisition process. 
The two primary themes that each major panel or commission to study Defense 
Department acquisition has had in common are training people and simplifying the 
budgetary process.  The Packard Commission, in the mid-1980’s stated that the greatest 
chance for fundamental improvement in the performance of defense acquisition was a 
fundamental change in the budgetary process.  Even within the existing budgetary 
process and the “Big-A” as defined by the DAPA Project, a well equipped cadre of 
systems engineering professionals can effectively support the program managers in 
making incremental improvements in the cost and schedule performance or our nation’s 
most critical national security space systems. 
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